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Sir Humphrey: With Trident we could obliterate the whole of Eastern
Europe.
Prime Minister: I don't want to obliterate the whole of Eastern Europe.
Sir Humphrey: It's a deterrent!
Prime Minister: It's a bluff. . . I probably wouldn't use it. . .
Sir Humphrey: Yes, but they don't know you probably wouldn't.
Prime Minister: They probably do.
Sir Humphrey: Yes, they probably know that you probably wouldn't but
they can't certainly know!
Prime Minister: They probably certainly know that I probably wouldn't!
Sir Humphrey: Yes, but even though they probably certainly know that
you probably wouldn't they don't certainly know that, although you
probably wouldn't, there is no probability that you certainly would!
Prime Minister: What?
(BBC Series Yes, Prime Minister: The Grand Design, first shown 9th
January 1986  with thanks to Hoye[2005] for the reminder)
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You know what people are like, my father said. Someone says, `I suppose
Leonard Kitchens could have put the rifle in the gutter, he's always in and
out of the hotel,' and the next person drops the `I suppose' and repeats the
rest as a fact.
Dick Francis, The 10 lb. Penalty [1997, p. 206]

1.1 Motivation
In the new world of Big Data, the worldwide web, and electronic publishing,
information is expanding at such an incredible rate that no one knows how
to begin making inroads into all of the information available. According to
Gunelius [retrieved July 12, 2014] based upon a graphic produced by the
computer software company DOMO, this was where some of this new data
was coming from in 2013:
Every minute:
• Facebook users share nearly 2.5 million pieces of content.
• Twitter users tweet nearly 300,000 times.
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• Instagram users post nearly 220,000 new photos.
• YouTube users upload 72 hours of new video content.
• Apple users download nearly 50,000 apps.
• Email users send over 200 million messages.
• Amazon generates over $80,000 in online sales.
Putting into perspective what this volume means, Gunelius [retrieved
July 12, 2014] further writes: "Think of it this way  five exabytes of
content were created between the birth of the world and 2003. In 2013, 5
exabytes of content were created each day." She continues the comparison:
"all of the written works of mankind created since the beginning of recorded
history in all languages equals 50 petabytes of information" remarking that,
at the time of writing (2014) Google processed 20 petabytes of information
per day as a comparison.
Today, nearly three years later, the creation of new data is continuing
to escalate. It will be no surprise to the reader that no one knows how to
make sense out of all this data and put it to appropriate use. An article
from Business Insider claims that only about 0.5% of all data is currently
analyzed:
"The rate at which we're generating data is rapidly outpacing our
ability to analyze it." Professor Patrick Wolfe, Executive Director
of the University College of London's Big Data Institute, tells
Business Insider. "The trick here is to turn these massive data
streams from a liability into a strength." (Browning, 2015)
Professor Wolfe has hit the nail on the head: turning this data from a
liability to a strength is an important goal.
Clearly, this volume of digital information is beyond the capability of the
humans producing it to process it by hand. Because of the massively large
amounts of new information being produced each year, we are becoming
more and more reliant on using automated methods to help us try to make
sense of this information by using the speed and power of computers to
helping us analyze text to find nuggets of useful and pertinent information
to increase our understanding of the world around us, and to locate patterns
which help us make informed decisions or to identify developing threats in
time to preserve lives, property and national security. Not all of this volume
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is text-based; photos, videos, music, podcasts, etc., make up a significant
proportion.
Indeed there has already been much work in trying to make sense of it all:
the fields of information extraction, information retrieval, document classi-
fication and sentiment analysis are just a few examples of such applications
(for an excellent brief overview of a variety of such techniques, cf. Kao and
Poteet [2007]). Some techniques work using structured data; for example,
knowledge extraction techniques operating on structured information such
as relational databases and ontologies can help to determine new informa-
tion buried within. Symmetrical relationships are an example of this: if our
database contains the information that John is married to Susan, we can
derive the new (to us) information that Susan is married to John.
But what about all of the new information that is being churned out
every day on myriad topics in online newspapers, journals and magazines,
digitally published research papers, reports on government and corporate
websites, blogs and ebooks? This information is structured into sentences,
paragraphs and chapters of varying length, not into neatly labeled rows and
columns stored in files of similar and related items. In order to use this
information, we must first parse the words that are in each sentence and
make use of patterns appearing in the text to begin making sense of the
words.
There have been great advances in recent years in text analytics: tech-
nologies which analyze natural language text using linguistic, statistical and
machine learning algorithms to automatically perform such tasks using cer-
tain characteristics of written human language to determine which docu-
ments may be pertinent to our investigations, identifying persons, places or
organizations, and identifying fact about or relationships between persons,
places and events.
However, in all of this, there is one area which still remains problematic:
how certain can we be that the information we thus discover is true. And
how might we quantify the "truthfulness"?
To illustrate this point, let's consider the following sentences:
(1) John is a terrorist.
(2) I believe John is a terrorist.
(3) Mary told me John is a terrorist.
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(4) The CIA suspects that John is a terrorist.
(5) It simply isn't possible that John is a terrorist.
(6) Do you think John is a terrorist?
(7) If John is a terrorist, then I am the Queen of Sheba.
Each of these sentences contains the same pattern John is a terrorist.
An algorithm trained to look for such patterns would result in the relation
John IS-A terrorist as a result for each of them.
However, there is other information contained in nearly all of these sen-
tences which gives us a reason to doubt the veracity of the fact of John
being a terrorist. When (1) is processed: we have no reason, based on this
sentence, not to consider this a fact. (NB: we may have reason to doubt
the accuracy of the source of this sentence which would affect our ultimate
decision, but this is another discussion.). All of the remaining sentences
include elements which insert some uncertainty about the truth of John be-
ing a terrorist. In (2) the writer expresses his personal opinion about the
situation. Both (3) and (4) express hearsay, as the writer is repeating infor-
mation received from third parties. Additionally, in (4) the use of the verb
to suspect indicates uncertainty on the part of the original source about
the opinion being expressed. In (5) the writer expresses her conviction that
John being a terrorist is untrue, while (6) is a question rather than a state-
ment, and as such requests rather than conveys information. And lastly, (6)
is a conditional, and therefore uncertain as a result; additionally, it may be
noted, that the statement contains sarcasm, which is intended to convey the
speaker's strong doubts that John could be a terrorist.
These examples illustrate how the credibility of the propositional con-
tent John is a terrorist relies on linguistic clues contained in each sentence.
In this case, the credibility ranges from fact (1) to doubt (5) to disbelief (7)
with varying shades in between, while (6) might be interpreted as complete
lack of knowledge as to the truth of John's status.
It is clear from not only the examples above, but also from the quote
with which this chapter begins, that, if we plan to make use of extracted
information, it is not sufficient to simply focus on algorithms that identify
patterns in text in order to extract facts and meaning from textual infor-
mation. We cannot treat all information as equally valid: we need to be
4
able to determine whether that which we extract is credible. Before storing
this extracted information in databases or ontologies, for use in models or
to fuse with other pieces of information to help us make decisions, or rec-
ognize growing threats, we need to examine the clues embedded within the
surrounding text to evaluate the truth of the assertion in the sentence.
However, recognition of such clues is just one part of the problem. The
second part is determining how to evaluate these clues, and how to assign
them some sort of weighting which reflects their relative credibility. In par-
ticular, as the results of the algorithms text extraction are often used within
mathematical models which are designed to fuse the information acquired
with other information in order to gain knowledge, it is of interest to assign
(numerical) values which may be used by mathematical algorithms.
However, it turns out that in evaluating such clues and assigning them
weights is complicated by the fact that even the humans who use and in-
terpret these clues are not in complete agreement, as demonstrated by the
following anecdote by Sherman Kent of the CIA:
A few days after the estimate appeared, I was in information con-
versation with the Policy Planning Staff's chairman. We spoke
of Yugoslavia and the estimate. Suddenly he said, By the way,
what did you people mean by the expression `serious possibility'?
What kind of odds did you have in mind? I told him that my
person estimate was on the dark side, namely, that the odds were
around 65 to 35 in favor of an attack. He was somewhat jolted
by this; he and his colleagues had read serious possibility to
mean odds very considerably lower. Understandably troubled by
this want of communication, I began asking my own colleagues
to the Board of National Estimates what odds they had had in
mind when they agreed to that wording. It was another jolt to
find that each Board member had had somewhat different odds
in mind and the low man was thinking of about 20 to 80, the
high of 80 to 20. The rest ranged in between. Kent [1964]
This clearly illustrates, as we will see in more detail later (cf. Chapter
6, Towards Quantifying Evidentiality in Natural Language), that even those
individuals with similar training, background and working domains will not
necessarily interpret such lexical clues identically. While this may complicate
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our task, it turns out there is some consistency in the relative ordering of
such clues that we can exploit for our purposes.
The reader may ask, why is assigning a value reflecting the credibility of
the information which we extract from text interesting or useful? To what
end? In the following section we will discuss in more depth one of the im-
portant applications in which the credibility of extracted textual information
plays a significant role.
1.2 Why Numerical Values?
As we move further into the first half of the 21st century, the world appears
to be getting more and more unstable with the growth of terrorism, increas-
ingly radical groups of individuals focused on religious, political or military
dominance. A major concern for nations is the safety and well-being of citi-
zens, the stability of the underlying financial and political systems on which
these nations are based. One, perhaps even the most important, weapon
against terrorism is information. Good, reliable information may help au-
thorities to ward off deadly attacks, identify and arrest individuals involved,
and to dismantle terrorist organizations to weaken them. Decisions made
upon questionable, unreliable information may prove fatal  at a minimum,
decision-makers must be aware that information might be uncertain in order
to factor that appropriately into the decision-making process. For proactive
responses, information about future events (by its very nature non-factual
and uncertain) may play a significant role in, for example, apprehending
ringleaders, or preventing an attack.
Additionally, in recent years the world has experienced a number of sig-
nificant natural disasters and man-made crisis: the attacks on the the World
Trade Center in 2001, the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004, the 2010 earth-
quake in Haiti, to name just a few. Reliable information from various sources
such as police, fire, military, hospitals, etc., is essential during the aftermath
of the crisis. Particularly with the advent of social media, rumor, hearsay
and deliberate untruths (trolling) propagate wildly through social media
channels, complicating and even endangering rescue efforts. The ability to
identify original observations from second- or third-hand information is im-
portant, to speculative information as speculation and not fact with help
crisis managers separate the wheat from the chaff.
6
But why are we interested in assigning numerical values to indicate the
uncertainness of extracted information?
Making sense of large volumes of information is increasingly being ac-
complished by computerized algorithms which analyze the information, de-
termining relationships between various pieces of information, and identify-
ing connections and patterns within the information which single events or
activities of interest to the decision-makers. These algorithms sit on math-
ematical models and systems which evaluate the patterns to determine the
likelihood that they point to particular actions or events. The determination
of these likelihood is based upon weights which have been assigned to various
aspects of the model, for example, how indicative a particular relationship
is of a future threatening event. All data which is input into the system is
weighted as to how strongly we believe the data to be factual or reliable:
this is to off-set the well-known "garbage in, garbage out" effect. The algo-
rithms which use the input return results that are also weighted as to the
likelihood of a given event occurring; this likelihood is calculated in part us-
ing the weights assigned to the input. Therefore, we want to have a way to
assign a numerical weight for the credbility of the extracted text information
to be used by the fusion algorithms. (N.B., Chapter 6 Mathematical The-
ories of Uncertainty) provides an overview of some of the more well-known
underlying mathematical systems used by such computer algorithms.)
When text-based information is extracted using natural language pro-
cessing tools, it is pulled out of its context as we have seen in the example
sentences earlier in this chapter. Once extracted, there are two ways of
assessing this information. The first is essentially consider all extracted in-
formation as equally reliable, with the result that the system treats both
speculative information and confirmed, reliable information as equally "fac-
tual" (or "non-factual" as the case may be). The second method is for
human reviewers to examine the extracted information and provide some
sort of credbility weighting. However, this second method has several weak-
nesses. One weakness is that weight assigned becomes a function of a given
reviewer's personal belief about the veracity of the information, that is to
say, the reviewer will rate it according to whether the information seems
valid according to the reviewer's perception of the world. A second weak-
ness, as we have seen in Sherman Kent's anecdote above, the numerical value
of the weights can vary significantly from reviewer to reviewer (i.e., weights
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are inconsistent). In either case, the extraction process has removed any
telling clues about the source and reliability of the information which might
influence the reviewer's assignment of a numerical credibility value.
The human reviewing process has another weakness: the sheer volume of
information which is being generated, and the time which would be needed
to perform a reasonable analysis. Thus, it behooves us to try to find alter-
native methodologiesto support the process of assigning credibility weights
to natural language information .
One obvious method for accomplishing this is to evaluate lexical clues
intentionally embedded by the writer to strengthen or weaken the proposition
contained in the sentence and use these as a basis for generating a credibility
factor. That is the focus of this thesis.
1.3 Structure of This Thesis
Chapters 2 and 3 focus on the concept of uncertainty. Chapter 2 What
is Uncertainty? is an overview of uncertainty as an over-arching concept.
What exactly constitutes uncertainty? What are the various facets and
expressions of this concept? How is it defined? It appears to be a glass half
full or half empty question. It turns out, there is consensus on neither what
exactly uncertainty is, or nor how other related concepts such as vagueness or
imprecision fit into the picture. For some authors, anything below absolute
knowledge is uncertain, for others such as Rubin [2010], certainty can be
subclassified into absolute, moderate and low, with uncertainty ranking as
the lowest level. For some authors uncertainty is a subcategory of other
concepts. Similarly, some see vagueness as a form of imprecision, whereas
some find it to be the other way around. Is ambiguity a subset of vagueness
or or the other way around, or are, perhaps, the two conceptually different?
And where does fuzziness fit into the picture? What about consistency
and completeness? We will examine viewpoints from a number of authors
from different domains as to how they define and classify various aspects of
uncertainty, and how these are related. It seems that there is no single perfect
answer for all cases. Indeed, what we will see is that the understanding of
uncertainty and related concepts may vary depending upon the domain in
which the researcher works.
In Chapter 3 we focus more specifically concepts and aspects of uncer-
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tainty in natural language, in this case, English. Here again we begin by
examining the viewpoints of a number of authors about the manifestations
and forms of uncertainty, both implicit and explicit, in English text. We
then look at how various researchers define and categorize these language
elements according to their uses in English. We end with an overview of En-
glish lexical items and formulations which are associated with uncertainty
and from this we derive our classification of uncertainty in natural language
for this thesis. This definition differentiates between uncertainty within the
propositional content (some, few, many) and uncertainty about the proposi-
tional content (possibly, unlikely, might be), the latter of which is our focus.
In Chapter 4 Evidentiality, Epistemic Modality, or Epistemic Stance?
we examine terminology used by linguists to describe the aspects of the
uncertainty in the working description of uncertainty representation used in
this work, namely epistemic modality, evidentiality and epistemic stance. As
in the preceding chapters, there is some disagreement among experts as to
the use of these terms. Based upon the discussion, as well as the practical
goal of application of the results of this thesis, we select our terminology for
the remainder of the thesis: evidentiality.
The mathematics of uncertainty is the main focus of Chapter 5 Mathe-
matical Theories of Uncertainty, in which we look briefly at a selection of
mathematical representations and theories used for the description and cal-
culation of uncertainty, while Chapter 6 Towards Quantifying Evidentiality
in Natural Language examines previous work done by researchers to apply
measures of quantification to natural language lexical constructs which con-
vey uncertainty. The main focus of Chapter 6 is, of course, on quantifying
uncertainty about the propositional content.
In Chapter 7 Putting It All Together we use the discussions and conclu-
sions of the preceding chapters as the foundation for an algorithm which can
be used to calculate an evidentiality weighting for the propositional content
of a statement based upon lexical clues in the sentence. Additionally, we
demonstrate how the results may be mapped onto other credibility weight-
ing scales for use by existing applications based upon mathematical systems
such as those described in Chapter 5 Mathematical Representations of Un-
certainty.
Finally, in the final chapter of this thesis (Chapter 8) we recap with our




The only relevant thing is uncertainty - the extent of our own knowledge and
ignorance.
Bruno de Finetti, [1974, p. xi]
There are some statements that you know to be true, others that you know to
be false, but with the majority of statements you do not know whether they
are true or false; we say that, for you, these statements are uncertain.
David Lindley [2006, p. 1]
. . .As we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know.
We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are
some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns  the
ones we don't know we don't know. Donald Rumsfeld [retrieved 23 Aug 2014]
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2.1 Introduction
Before beginning any attempt to describe a model for evaluating and quan-
tifying uncertainty, one must first examine what is meant by uncertainty.
This is less trivial than one may assume: like most things in our world, it
depends upon your perspective. Defining, describing and modeling uncer-
tainty is nuanced and filtered by experience, knowledge, application, belief,
and even, to a certain extent, the languages we speak.
In this chapter, we will examine numerous approaches to formalizing and
understanding uncertainty. Some are described in words, others in pictures.
Some models focus solely on the concept of uncertainty (as demonstrated
through its use as the root of hierarchical trees), other models see uncer-
tainty as subsumed within a larger concept, such as ignorance, imprecision
or imperfection.
Some models come from the field of information theory, from artificial
intelligence, or from decision theory and economics. Others come from the
fields of social sciences and computer graphics and ethics. Each provides a
different viewpoint and, while some overlap, others differ quite dramatically
from the others.
This is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of the field, but rather an
overview of various methodologies with an eye to those which are of interest
within the context of this thesis.
At the end of this chapter, in the interest of reducing misunderstanding
and ambiguity (and thereby the reader's uncertainty) we will define many
of the terms and concepts discussed in the following sections as they will be
used further within this thesis.
2.2 Towards Defining Uncertainty
Uncertainty, in its popular, general sense, is defined by various English lan-
guage dictionaries as
• the state of being unsure of something Webster's Online Dictionary
[retrieved on Sep. 29, 2010]
• the condition of being uncertain; doubt The American Heritage Dictio-
nary of the English Language, Fourth Edition [retrieved on Feb. 10,
2013]
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• the state of being uncertain Oxford English Dictionary [retrieved on
Sep. 29, 2010]
Figure 2.1: Entry for uncertainty in Roget's 21st Century Thesaurus, Third
Edition [retrieved on Sep. 29, 2010]
Roget's Thesaurus (online) lists a myriad of synonyms for uncertainty as
shown in Figure 2.1. From this, one can see at a quick glance, how widely
diverse the numerous shadings of the word uncertainty are. Indeed W.J.M.
Levelt [1989] and Clark [1987, 1988] maintain that there is no actual syn-
onymy, as the core meanings of any two lexical items are not exactly identical
(the uniqueness principle). Some of the synonyms are oriented more toward
the psychological, that is, to a person's state of mind: anxiety, bewilderment,
confusion, uneasiness, worry. Other synonyms reflect attitude: doubt, mis-
trust, scepticism, ambivalence, suspicion. This thesaurus entry makes one
thing quite clear: there are many different ways to express uncertainty in
words. Just as one selects the appropriate synonym from the thesaurus de-
pending upon the shading required by the context in which the word will be
used, the placing of the concept uncertainty within a conceptual model will
depend upon domain in which it is being used, as well as each researcher's
particular individual understanding of exactly what constitutes uncertainty.
When one considers that a number of entries appear as underlined hy-
perlinks in the synonym list, one may say that the entries displayed are in
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fact considered to be the most applicable synonyms for uncertainty, that is,
the entries displayed are in fact the most common synonyms for uncertainty
in everyday usage. However, that there are other words and definitions with
subtler or more domain-specific meanings that reflect a certain amount of
uncertainty in their meanings that do not appear on this list. Within certain
fields of endeavor such as statistics, economics, or information theory, there
are definitions of and synonyms for uncertainty which are neither contained
in the dictionary definitions above, nor in the thesaurus listing. An example
of such specialized definition comes from the fields of economics: Knight,
reflecting on the common  within that field  synonymic use of uncertainty
and risk (the latter of which, it should be noted, does not appear in the
Roget's listing above) states: it will appear that a measurable uncertainty,
or 'risk' proper, as we shall use the term, is so far different from an unmea-
surable one that it is not in effect an uncertainty at all. F.H. Knight [1921]
In other words, Knight differentiates between measurable and unmeasurable
uncertainties, assigning the former the moniker risk. A number of elements
are pertinent to the focus of this thesis  ambiguity, lack of confidence, in-
conclusiveness, conjecture, vagueness which have to do with uncertainty in
text are included in the list but other relevant synonyms such as imprecision
or nonspeicifity, do not appear in the thesaurus listing.
Just as there are many different and specialized definitions of uncertainty,
there are a multitude of ways of modeling and classifying uncertainty, each
of which reflects the viewpoint of the researcher and his field of interest. For
example, the typology of uncertainty of Smithson [1989], which we look at
in more detail below, reflects his background in behavioral science, while the
work of Klir and Wierman [1999] reflects issues in information theory and
computational sciences. Both models use certain common terminology such
as ambiguity and nonspecificity, but each has a different understanding and
thus ordering of the concepts represented by these terms: Klir and Wierman
[1999] view nonspecificity as a subset of ambiguity, while Smithson [1989]
places nonspecificity under vagueness, rather than under ambiguity.
In the following subsections we will examine a number of typologies and
models for classification of uncertainty which have been developed within
various fields of research. Again, this survey is not intended to be exhaustive
but rather to provide the reader with an overview of the variety of viewpoints
conveying richness of diversity in thinking on this subject. These models
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have not, however, been selected simply at random: each of these models
has been selected because each contains a point of relevance for the model
being presented in this paper.
2.2.1 Uncertainty in Data (Information Theory)
Within the field of generalized Information Theory, Klir and Wierman [1999]
have divided uncertainty into two subcategories: fuzziness and ambiguity,
with the latter being further subdivided into the categories strife and non-
specificity (Figure 2.2).
Figure 2.2: Typology of uncertainty [Klir and Wierman, 1999, p. 103]
The first level of distinction separates the less precise from the more
precise. Fuzzy data are characterized by lack of definite or sharp distinction,
with further synonyms including vagueness, indistinctness  in other words,
there is a certain amount of imprecision in their values or descriptions.
The second subcategory, ambiguity, is defined as one to many relation-
ships [Klir and Wierman, 1999, p. 103], which implies the problem of clas-
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sification of the data under consideration rather than a lack of precision of
value or description of an individual datum. In other words, data may have
precise values, but their collective meaning may be imprecise. The sub-
category of ambiguity which has been designated strife (disagreement in
choosing among several alternatives [Klir and Wierman, 1999, p. 103]), de-
scribes situations in which data represent dissonance, discrepancy or conflict,
i.e., that two or more data elements are to a certain degree contradictory.
The second subcategory under ambiguity, nonspecificity, describes situations
in which two or more alternatives are left unspecified [Klir and Wierman,
1999, p. 103], i.e., the data may be interpreted in more than one way, or
point to more than one solution.
This model (Figure 2.2) concerns itself with data in systems, and appears
to make the assumption that data elements are true even when they 
their values or relationships between them  may be uncertain. There is no
judgment as to the veracity of the content of the data. In other words, there
is no provision in the model for classifying data which is false, deceptive, or
otherwise partially or completely erroneous. For these very human aspects
of an uncertain world, we need to look at other models.
2.2.2 Uncertainty Classification for Artificial Intelligence
Similar to the typology proposed by Klir and Wierman in the preceding
section, Krause and Clark [1993] have focused on defining a classification
for uncertainty which pertains to specific problems for the development of
artificial intelligence applications (Figure 2.3). In contrast, however, Krause
and Clark do not focus on uncertainty of data but rather on that which
appears in the propositions manipulating this data.
This classification model first differentiates between types of uncertainty
that apply to single propositions (unary) and those which apply to sets of
propositions (set theoretic). Each of these is further subdivided into two ma-
jor classifications, ignorance and conflict, which are then further decomposed
into characteristics of each relevant to either single or multiple propositions.
While there are some similarities of these characteristics to those in Klir
and Wierman (i.e., ambiguity, strife/conflict), there are some new consider-
ations: the concepts of anomaly/error, ignorance, incompleteness and irrel-
evance which are missing from the previous model. One might argue that
Klir and Wierman have tacitly included these concepts in their model under
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Figure 2.3: Uncertainty classification for artificial intelligence. [Krause and
Clark, 1993, p. 7]
the classification strife. Anomaly, for example, could be viewed as discord 
while nonspecificity could be seen as a side-effect of ignorance and incom-
pleteness. However, such an interpretation may not have been the intention
of the authors.
Certain elements contained within this model, such as the concepts of
ignorance, error, and irrelevance are dealt with more explicitly by Smithson
[1989] in the following section.
2.2.3 Uncertainty in knowledge (Social Sciences)
Smithson [1989] bases his typology of ignorance (containing elements of un-
certainty) on his experiences in the area of cognitive science, which includes
aspects of human behavior and unreliability (Figure 2.4). These are missing
in the typology from Klir and Weirman, and only partially covered by Krause
and Clark. They are, however, of paramount importance for the subject of
this thesis.
Interestingly, the major change in viewpoint from the preceding models
is the placement of uncertainty in this model. Whereas both of the preced-
ing models focus on defining uncertainty, Smithson sees uncertainty in the
middle of the larger concept of ignorance. All three models contain the term
ambiguity ; however, Klir and Wierman have designated this as one of their
direct subcategories of uncertainty, as does Smithson, whereas Krause and
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Clark see this as a subcategory of conflict.
There are further interesting differences between the various models. For
example, Klir and Wierman designate vagueness as a subcategory of fuzzi-
ness whereas Smithson inverts the ordering. In the case of fuzziness, one
might conjecture that this lies perhaps on a differing understanding of the
term based upon expertise: in the one case fuzziness is very specifically de-
fined as a mathematical model, the other definition is in a more generic sense
of lack of clarity.
Figure 2.4: Typology of ignorance. [Smithson, 1989, p. 9]
Of interest in the Smithson model is that human factors play a signifi-
cant role, in particular, in the sub-branch irrelevance (e.g., untopicality and
taboo) and to a lesser extent in the subbranch distortion. When dealing with
information derived from humans, as we will be doing within the scope of
this thesis, one cannot ignore the vagaries, shortcomings and motivations of
the individuals producing the information.
2.2.4 Imperfect information: Imprecision  Uncertainty
Smets is a leading name on the topic of uncertainty in artificial intelligence.
He wrote many papers revolving around the overarching topic of imperfec-
tion in data or information. As shown in Figure 2.5, Smets [July 2, 1999]
divides imperfection into three major areas: imprecision, inconsistency and
uncertainty, further explaining:
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Imprecision and inconsistency are properties related to the con-
tent of the statement: either more than one world or no world is
compatible with the available information. Uncertainty is a prop-
erty that results from the lack of information about the world
for deciding if the statement is true or false. Imprecision and
inconsistency are essentially properties of the information itself
whereas uncertainty is a property of the relation between the in-
formation and our knowledge about the world. [Smets, July 2,
1999, p. 2].
Imprecision he further breaks down into imprecision without error and
imprecision with error. Ambiguous, approximate, fuzzy, incomplete or miss-
ing information is assumed to be without error, that is, it is not incorrect,
just unclear in some way. Imprecision with error he decomposes into erro-
neous or incorrect when it is completely wrong, inaccurate when the data is
not correct in some way but the error is minimal, distorted when both inac-
curate and invalid, biased when systematically distorted, and nonsensical or
meaningless when dramatically erroneous.
Figure 2.5: Adaptation of Smets typology of imperfect information by [Jous-
selme et al., 2003, p. 1211]
Furthermore, he divides uncertainty into objective and subjective. Objec-
tive uncertainty, he argues, is related to chance or randomness but he further
refines it into propensity  how likely an event is to happen (measured as
a probability), its disposition, the possibility of the event's happening. (NB:
the mathematical concepts of probability and possibility will be discussed in
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a later chapter.) Subjective uncertainty is a measure of one's belief that this
could occur, based upon one's understanding of the world.
Smets [July 2, 1999] provides a quite detailed structured thesaurus of
imperfection which supports his model.
2.2.5 Epistemic Interpretations of Uncertainty
In Jousselme et al. [2003] the authors look at uncertainty for use in sit-
uation analysis from the perspective of military and security applications,
and present an overview of several models for uncertainty and examine the
applicability of those models to their field of interest.
Additionally, they add an overview of the quantification methods for the
various interpretations of uncertainty, which provides an interesting insight
into some of the variations of the models reviewed in this chapter. It is,
therefore, interesting to take a brief look at this classification model, partic-
ularly as this is a generalization of the terms objective and subjective from
Smets's model presented in the previous section.
Figure 2.6: Epistemic interpretations of uncertainty. [Jousselme et al., 2003,
p. 1212]
As shown in Figure 2.6, they divide the interpretations into empirical
and inductive. Empirical implies experimentation and knowledge (internal
representation) of possible states. Under empirical there are three cate-
gories:classical, relative frequencies and propensity. Classical implies com-
plete knowledge of all possible outcomes and is based upon combinatorics
and symmetry. Relative frequencies, on the other hand, assumes that com-
plete knowledge is not available, but gives conditional results based upon
the results of a large number of experiments. Propensity, which they use
similarly to Smets, is the inherent preference or inclination toward a specific
state.
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The second type of uncertainty in this model is inductive, in which un-
certainty is quantified, not through experimentation or knowledge, but by
logic or by one's beliefs about possible outcomes (not necessarily based upon
experience as in propensity).
Several of these concepts will be further discussed in later chapters in
this thesis.
2.2.6 Imperfect Knowledge of the Information State
Gershon [1998] comes at uncertainty from yet a different angle: presenta-
tion of an imperfect world through visualization (graphics). The applied
nature (visual presentation of information) of his model is obvious: certain
aspects of his model appear synonymously in other models discussed above
 inconsistency, incompleteness or inaccuracy  but they have been classified
differently. Although the focus in his model is somewhat tangential to the
topic of this thesis, there are a few aspects worth noting.
Figure 2.7: Taxonomy of the causes of imperfect knowledge of the informa-
tion state [Gershon, 1998, p. 43]
For his purposes, Gershon [1998] defines uncertainty as data and in-
formation [which are] known, but [where] the user is not sure about their
existence or accuracy. This corresponds to elements of the model of Krause
and Clark (partial knowledge, confidence). Gershon places imperfect knowl-
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edge at the center of his model Figure 2.7. He views uncertainty as a result
of imperfect knowledge, a view which correlates to a certain extent with
Smithson.
Debatable in this model is the contention that imperfect knowledge of the
information state results in corrupt data and information. In the sense that
the term corrupt data is widely used to indicate data which is erroneous in
some way, one could argue that this arrow in the diagram should be reversed,
i.e., that corrupt data contributes to imperfect knowledge, rather than vice
versa.
2.2.7 Typology for Information Uncertainty
In the intelligence area, the consequences of misjudging the accuracy of in-
formation or drawing erroneous conclusions may be, quite literally, fatal.
Therefore, an understanding of sources and types of uncertainty in informa-
tion is necessary. To this end, Thomson et al. [2005] have created a typology
defining different categories of uncertainty pertinent to the fields of data
analysis and intelligence.
Figure 2.8: Categories in Analytic Uncertainty Typology. [Thomson et al.,
2005, p. 152]
In contrast to the preceding models, which attempted to provide more
abstract classifications of various aspects of uncertainty, Thomson et al. have
quite pragmatically examined various sources of uncertainty. Figure 2.8 pro-
vides a listing of the categories identified, with a brief definition of each
category, while Figure 2.9 decomposes each category into more detailed sub-
categories and provides a few examples of each category.
Additionally, Figure 2.9 provides a quite valuable checklist for investigat-
ing the various forms of uncertainty, particularly on the analytical level. As
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Figure 2.9: Analytic Uncertainty Typology developed by [Thomson et al.,
2005, p. 153]
a result, this list is quite closely aligned with the model for the evaluation of
uncertainty in information fusion which we present in this thesis
2.2.8 Uncertainty in Decision-Making
Tannert et al. [2007] address uncertainty within the context of decision-
making, in particular with a focus on the moral and ethical issues involved
in decision-making based upon incomplete knowledge. Whereas Klir and
Wierman[1999] focused on uncertainty in data and Smithson[1989 on the
uncertainty in knowledge, Tannert et al. [2007] analyzed where uncertainty
comes into the process of decision-making, with a strong focus on the rami-
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fications of uncertainty upon decisions, in particular upon the consequences
and risks resulting from these decisions. According to the authors, each of
the sub-forms [in their taxonomy] describes a particular type of mismatch
between the knowledge required and the knowledge available for rational
decision-making. [Tannert et al., 2007, p. 894] This mismatch is of particu-
lar interest within this paper, as the model presented is designed to support
decision-making.
In their typology (Figure 2.10), Tannert et al. subdivided uncertainty
into two major categories: objective uncertainty and subjective uncertainty.
Objective uncertainty, based upon available knowledge and underlying, of-
ten complex, situations. In other words, objective uncertainty is based on
things that be, such as situational relationships and information which
is not subjectively interpreted (or, in the case of knowledge, is accepted
as truth). Objective uncertainty is further decomposed into epistemolog-
ical uncertainty (gaps in knowledge) and ontological uncertainty (caused
by the stochastic features of a situation, which will usually involve complex
technical, biological and/or social systems. . . often characterized by nonlinear
behavior, which makes it impossible to resolve uncertainties by deterministic
reasoning and/or research)[Tannert et al., 2007, p. 895].
Figure 2.10: The taxonomy of uncertainties and decisions. [Tannert et al.,
2007, p. 895]
Subjective uncertainty is characterized by an inability to apply appro-
priate moral rules. [Tannert et al., 2007, p. 895] Within this classification
the authors differentiate between two subcategories: moral uncertainty, in
which there is a lack of applicable moral rules on which to base decisions,
requiring decision-making by extrapolation from more generalized rules (i.e.,
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interpretation); and rule uncertainty, in which decisions are made not based
upon rules, but upon internalized experiences and moral values. In short,
subjective uncertainty results from the lack of clear, commonly accepted
rules, and/or the need (or desire) to base decisions upon internalized values.
Figure 2.11: Igloo of uncertainty. [Tannert et al., 2007, p. 894]
In addition to their classification of types of uncertainty, Tannert et al.
have created a schematic approach to represent the effects of this uncer-
tainty upon decision-making as shown in Figure 2.11. In this representation,
they return to some of the ideas of Smithson, in particular, ignorance and
indecidability albeit with some modifications.
Our schematic approach, the `igloo of uncertainty' . . . mainly
distinguishes between open and closed forms of both ignorance
and knowledge. Within that framework, dangers are defined in
terms of the possible outcomes of a given situation. To under-
stand the potential adverse effects of a decision, we therefore
require an approximation of the quality of dangers in any given
event. Consequently, a rational approach is to give an estimate
of the probability that the respective event will happen, and to
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assess the hazard and the possible impact of the event. Classi-
cal risk assessment then takes the product of probability and the
expected hazard dimension to obtain a quantitative measure of
risk. [Tannert et al., 2007, p. 894]
Interestingly, several elements of the Smithson typology appear in this
igloo schema, albeit some in forms which are not immediately apparent:
e.g., Smithson's ignorance appears as Tannert's undecidability (I cannot
know). Here it should also be noted that the igloo model, while conceived
with ethical considerations in mind, also illustrates the connection between
risk and uncertainty as classically defined within the field of economics.
2.2.9 Uncertainty in Linguistic Data
In Auger and Roy [2008] the authors discuss uncertainty within the frame-
work of linguistic data. They examine a number of different models of uncer-
tainty, including several discussed above (e.g., Thomson, et al., Smithson),
but expand to include concepts specific to linguistic data such as polysemy,
homonymy, hedges and modals, as well as external factors including world-
views influenced by cultural perceptions and traditions.
Auger and Roy touch on one other interesting aspect for this thesis: verb
tense. While statements about events or states which took place in the past
may, to some extent, be verified as true or untrue, descriptions of most future
events are inherently uncertain. There will be a fuller discussion of this later
in Chapter 6.
Their view of uncertainty in linguistic data, shown in Figure 2.12, is
divided into linguistic ambiguities and referential ambiguities. According
to the authors' descriptions, linguistic ambiguity is tied to the meaning of
the words (symbols) used in a given language, while referential ambiguity
refers to cultural or other contextual elements which affect the content of
the communication.
Here one should note the sub-branch contextual elements includes at
least one leaf which is specific to spoken as opposed to written natural lan-
guage communication, namely body language. N.B.: from the context of its
placement in the graphic, one assumes mood indicates the speaker's feelings
rather than grammatical mood, the former is assumed, since modal verbs
and tenses are included under linguistic ambiguities and all other contextual
elements appear non-grammatical.
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Figure 2.12: Auger and Roy divide certainty/uncertainty in linguistic data
into two broad categories: linguistic ambiguities and referential ambiguities.
[[Auger and Roy, 2008, p. 4]]
2.2.10 Uncertainty in Information Fusion
In this section we move closer to the application area in which lies the rea-
son for this thesis: uncertainty in the area of information fusion. Kruger
et al. [2008] examined the different types and levels of uncertainty in the
information fusion process:
There are two main levels of uncertainty in this process. The first
level concerns each individual report or piece of information. This
level is comprised of two parts:
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• Source uncertainty: relative reliability of the information
source, as adjudged either by the system (device sources) or
evaluated by the reporter (human sources)
• Content uncertainty: the estimated veracity of the content
of a report, assigned by the system (e.g., device sources) or
as evaluated by the reporter (human sources)
It should, of course, be noted that source and content credibility
are generally not completely discrete. Particularly in the case of
a human source, the reliability of the source has a direct impact
on the credibility of the content: we tend to assign the informa-
tion delivered by a reliable source a higher degree of credibility
than the information we receive from someone whom we perceive
to be unreliable. The second level of uncertainty concerns the in-
terrelationship of various individual reports. This level is likewise
comprised of two parts:
• Correlation uncertainty: this uncertainty results from the
process of identifying and clustering potentially related re-
ports, based upon the variances encountered in comparing
features.
• Evidential uncertainty: result of matching reports to schemata
which describe specific threats or situations. This measure
of uncertainty is in many ways cumulative: its value is cal-
culated based upon the values of source, content and corre-
lation uncertainties from each of its mapped elements.
[Kruger et al., 2008, p. 686]
It is clear that this thesis is focused on content uncertainty as described
above. As briefly discussed in Chapter 1, the main motivation behind the
work in this thesis lie in finding a way to automatically generate weights
which provide insight into how trustworthy propostions expressed in natural
language may be based upon information in the sentence itself, rather than
relying on the evaluation by an analyst to assign a weight.
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2.3 Uncertainty Focus Within This Thesis
As demonstrated by the preceding overview, there are significant differences
in how uncertainty is perceived depending upon the context and application
of the model the authors were dealing with. Each of the models presented
offers interesting viewpoints; however (unsurprisingly), none of the models
above exactly suits the purposes of this thesis.
The focus of this research is upon written text  more specifically, writ-
ten text at the sentence or sub-sentence level  and upon the (automated)
exploitation of lexical and grammatical clues embedded in those sentences
to assign an evidential value to the propositions which they contain for the
purpose of building knowledge bases or for use in applications such as in-
formation fusion. Therefore, clues not contained in the text, such as body
language, tone of voice, situational context, precision, and many of the other
concepts which appear in models above are of no interest. We confine our
definitions of uncertainty solely to the written words before us, and that only
at the level of the sentence or below.
There are two basic categories of detectable uncertainty which appear at
the sentence level:
• Inexactness, which concerns uncertainty within the propositional of the
sentence, including imprecision, vagueness and ambiguity, and
• Evidentiality, which is the uncertainty about the propositional con-
tent of the sentence, including modal verbs, modal adverbs (including
words of estimative probability), markers of hearsay, belief, inference,
assumption, etc., and, in English to a certain degree, passive voice.
(Note: selection of evidentiality as used in this sense is discussed in
depth in Chapter 4.)
These are shown in Figure 2.13.
The sentence elements which express, directly or indirectly, uncertainty
about the propositional content of the sentence can generally be easily iden-
tified and exploited by computer to provide an initial assessment of the
certainty of the information which we receive in the form of written text.
For example, we can use verb tense to differentiate between events or states
which have occurred in the past as opposed to events or states which may or
may not take place at some point in the future (which is uncertain until it
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Figure 2.13: Uncertainty at the sentence level.
has happened). Other words or phrases also give us clear signals about the
uncertainty of the: modal verbs (might, could, etc.), lexical markers such as
modal adjectives (possibly, likely, etc.), or indicators of hearsay or opinion
(Sources said, I believe, etc.).
The following chapter will explain both types of sentence level uncertainty





. . . natural language sentences will very often be neither true, nor false, nor
nonsensical but rather true to a certain extent and false to a certain extent,
true in certain respects and false in other respects
George Lakoff [ 1973, p. 458]
Without hedging, the world is purely propositional, a rigid (rather dull)
place where things either are the case or not. With a hedging system language
is rendered more flexible and the world more suitable.
John Skelton [1968, p. 38]

3.1 Overview
At the conclusion of the preceding chapter, we presented a schematic in
which we defined uncertainty in natural language at the sentence level with
two main sub-types, evidential (uncertainty about the content of the propo-
sition) and inexactness (uncertainty within the content of the proposition).
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The distinction between these types is significant to our ends in this work.
In particular, we are interested in the lexical and grammatical markers which
signal the presence of potentially uncertain content. Therefore, we will ex-
plain this differentiation in more detail.
3.2 Uncertainty within the content
Natural language information may be uncertain in a variety of ways. Some
of these are identifiable at the sentence level (e.g., imprecision, vagueness,
ambiguity), while others are more generally found in larger contexts, i.e., over
multiple sentences, or documents. Examples of the latter are inconsistency
(i.e., conflicting, overlapping, gapping or confusing information), inaccuracy
(incorrect information) and contradiction. As our work focuses on sentence-
level analysis, we will confine the discussion below to those manifestations
of uncertainty which can be found at the sentence level.
Uncertainty on the sentence level may manifest itself by vagueness or
imprecision. That is, a sentence may contain elements which lack clarity or
specificity, by using words which are open to interpretation. Consider, for
example, sentence (8) which contains imprecise, non-specific information in
several forms.
(8) There were some animals in the road.
Some expresses an imprecise number. The reader might possibly make
some judgments on the range of numbers represented by some, although
this may be bounded by other equally imprecise values such as a couple,
a few, or several. Strictly speaking a couple refers to the quantity two.
However, in colloquial usage, a couple may be used to indicate more than
two (but not less). Cambridge Dictionaries Online [retrieved on Feb. 16,
2016] defines the venacular understanding in informal situations as "two
or a few things that are similar or the same, or two or a few people who
are in some way connected," while (retrieved on Feb. 16, 2016a offers the
idiomatic interpretation: "a couple of, more than two, but not many, of;
a small number of; a few." Merriam-Webster retrieved on Feb. 16, 2016a
defines the informal usage of a couple as " an indefinite small number ... few"
and Oxford Dictionaries(retrieved on Feb. 16, 2016a] defines a couple as an
"indefinite small number." Therefore, had the writer used a couple rather
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than some, we would have been able to assume the number of animals was a
quite small number two, three or, perhaps, four animals (but most definitely
more than one). On the other hand, many would have been used if there
were a noticeably larger number, such as twenty or fifty. Several is again
somewhat slippery: more than a couple  "more than two but not many"
Oxford Dictionaries [retrieved on Feb. 16, 2016b], "more than one or two,
but not a great many" Cambridge Dictionaries Online [retrieved on Feb.
16, 2016] with Merriam-Webster (retrieved on Feb. 16, 2016b confusingly
defining as "more than one" and "more than two but fewer than many" (the
differentiation lies in the context ). What thing is clear: several is less than
many, which the various sources agree to be "a large number."
But it is not just the number of animals which is uncertain: the animals
themselves are a second problem. The reader has no idea from the what sort
of animals these may be: cats? dogs? cows? elephants? Or possibly there
was a mixture of different types (a sheepdog and five sheep, for example).
One type of animal would most likely not be applicable here: a human. In
such a case, people or persons would have been used in place of animals.
However, statement (8) does not necessarily leave out the presence of a hu-
man: for example, when a herd of sheep are in the road, the shepherd is
usually somewhere in the vicinity as well, but the animals, not the shepherd,
would likely be considered as some sort of anomaly worth mentioning. Sim-
ilarly, a high level of precise detail may also be inaccurate: even if we were
told that there were six brown Jersey cows in the road, it may well be that
the observer neglected to let us know that there were two black herding dogs
as well, or failed to detected that one brown cow was in fact a Hereford and
not a Jersey.
Another vague element in the sentence is the road the animals were in.
From the conversational context, that is, from the preceding communica-
tions, the listener may in fact know precisely which road is under discussion.
Without that context, the reader would be unable to make such a determina-
tion and therefore the information remains vague. It is also entirely possible
that this information is unimportant or unnecessary for the listener:
(9) Sorry I was late arriving. There were some animals in the road.
By proving a context in the form of the sentence preceding the original
assertion as seen in (9), it is clear that the speaker is using (8) to explain
the reason for his late arrival. Unless the listener knows absolutely that the
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speaker is arriving from somewhere else in the same road, the information
conveyed is that somewhere along the route to the destination, which may
have involved multiple roads, there was a road in which animals were present
(and presumably posing a traffic hindrance).
Statements may be ambiguous, i.e., it may be open to more than one
interpretation or have more than one possible meaning:
(10) I saw her duck.
(11) Students hate annoying professors.
In (10) it is unclear whether the female person referred to has dipped
her head to avoid, say, a flying object or a low hanging branch, or whether
she keeps a waterfowl as a pet. In (11) either the students dislike professors
who irritate them, or whether students try to avoid making their professors
angry, perhaps in the hope of receiving a better grade in the course.
The presence of vagueness, imprecision or ambiguity does not make the
veracity of information which is conveyed in the assertion uncertain. In all
of the above-mentioned examples, we have no indications from the sentence
structure alone that the assertion is in anyway untrue or doubtful. We might
have background knowledge which leads us to doubt the veracity of a state-
ment because it contradicts other information that we have. Possibly we may
have reservations about the reliability of the source of that information: for
example, if we revisit (9) with the background knowledge that the speaker is
chronically tardy and always has a prepared excuse to explain his tardiness,
we might well doubt that the animals in the road existed, assuming that this
assertion provides the speaker with a convenient, but unverifiable, explana-
tion. However, without any such context, we have no reason not to believe
the assertions above, regardless of whether we may not be quite certain what
they exactly mean.
Thus, referring back to our model of uncertainty at the sentence level
from the end of the previous chapter, the examples above illustrate the un-
certainty within the content of the sentence, but there is nothing telling us
we should doubt the truth of the statement.
But human communication often does not consist solely of the transfer of
historical, factual information from one person to another. We humans make
assumptions, express doubt or disagreement; we pass on information which
others have told us, express our beliefs and wishes, make conjectures and
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assumptions, discuss events which may happen in the future (or might have
happened in the past). We convey conclusions about the state of things based
upon inferences made from other information. We may state our ignorance,
or contradict statements of others.
Even when a statement contains a detailed, unambiguous and precisely
described assertion, there may be clues that the speaker provides us with
that indicate there may be some reason to not accept this assertion as the
absolute truth. For example, the sentence may be formulated using a modal
adverb or a modal verb form which introduces an element of doubt, or there
may be other sentence elements which provide clues which indicate that the
assertion is not the product of direct observation by the speaker, but derived
by other means, leaving the veracity of the assertion open to some doubt.
The following section describes in more detail, how these formulations allow
us to make judgments about the truth of the proposition contained in the
sentence.
3.3 Uncertainty about the content
Revisiting and modifying sentence (1) from the previous section, we provide
some examples below which illustrate some of the ways in which the speaker
provides us with information that we can use to decide how much to believe
the proposition in the sentence.
(12) There may have been some animals in the road.
In (12), the modal verb expression may have been expresses either an
element of the writer's doubt in the veracity of this statement or is an indi-
cation of speculation. While we have no information as to how to precisely
interpret the writer's intent when using the modal verb, we do know that
the writer is uncertain about the truth of the content of the assertion.
The modal adverb in (13) conveys the possibility of there having been
animals but leaves some doubt:
(13) It is possible there were some animals in the road.
Whereas in (12) and (13), there is speculation or doubt about animals in
the road that may have originated with the writer, in (14) we have a slightly
different situation:
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(14) It was reported there were some animals in the road.
Here, the writer indicates that the information comes from another source
(i.e., hearsay) with no further clues as to where the information originated
from. We have the choice of either accepting this as simply an accurate
passing on of true information, or we can see this statement as uncertain, due
to either aspects of the informational content may change during re-telling,
or the possibility that there had been uncertainty clues in the original which
were ignored or simply not passed on. Additionally, as we have no further
information as to the source of the information (who reported?), we cannot
make a judgment as to its reliability based upon background information
we may have on that source. However, one can make the case that the
writer would not have included a reference to a third party if she did not
feel it important to convey that she herself had not witnessed the event
and therefore, is distancing herself from the assertion, rendering it (at least
slightly) uncertain.
It is a different case in (15) below:
(15) Mary told me there were some animals in the road.
Similarly to (14), in (15) the writer indicates that the information comes
from another source. This time, however, we have more information as
to where the information came from (Mary). Again, the writer distances
herself by telling us the information came from another source, but, should
we have some background knowledge about Mary's reliability as a source
of information, we may adjust our belief on the veracity of the information
based upon what we know about Mary.
In (16) we again have a formulation which indicates both an unidentified
third party as the source of information (via supposedly), which additionally
conveys a certain lack of confidence on the part of the writer regarding the
truth of the proposition:
(16) Supposedly there were some animals in the road.
For example, the speaker may be passing on to the tardy colleague's
excuse for his late arrival and wishes to convey that he does not quite believe
the tale. (When delivered verbally, an accompanying eye roll or skeptical
tone of voice would give the listener a more accurate idea of how much or
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little the writer believes this excuse; without these clues, we can only just
the written word as expressing some level of doubt.)
Similar to the examples above, example (17) may convey hearsay but
also something else:
(17) I believe there were some animals in the road.
The use of I believe in (17) may be interpreted in two ways: as an ex-
pression of belief on the part of the speaker that the tale is true, or possibly
as an indication of hearsay (Why was he late? I believe there were some
animals in the road.).
From the context of surrounding sentences, we should be able to deter-
mine which usage is intended. For example, going back to the example of
the oft-tardy colleague:
(18) I know he often tells fibs, but not in this case. I believe there were
some animals in the road.
The first sentence in (18) sets the context which lends credibility to the
second.
In (19) it becomes clear the correct interpretation is hearsay, in which
the speaker passes on what she understands was the cause of an automobile
accident.
(19) There was a report on the news of a terrible automobile accident. I
believe there were some animals in the road.
However, regardless whether we can identify the statement as belief or
hearsay (or a combination of the two) based on a broader context than just
the single sentence itself, the assertion remains uncertain.
The above are, of course, just a few examples of expressions of uncertainty
at the sentence level, and relatively simplistic ones at that. A quite exhaus-
tive discussion of some of the more subtle manifestations of uncertainty may
be found in Lindley [2006].
In the following sections we will examine in more detail markers and
indicators of uncertainty in English sentences with the specific focus on un-
certainty about the proposition rather than within it. Along the way we will
see, as in the previous chapter about uncertainty as a concept, that there
are as many different viewpoints and definitions as there are researchers.
36
3.4 Hedges, boosters, downtoners and other crea-
tures
Very often when one is asked to consider markers of uncertainty in natural
language, the first that comes to mind are modal adverbs: possibly, prob-
ably, likely, etc. The next categories are often modal verbs: might, could,
may, etc., followed by nouns such as likelihood, possibility, probability, and
so on. Lexical verbs like suggest, assume, seem, guess, etc., likewise convey
uncertainty, as do adjectives such as possible, probable, doubtful, etc.
For many researchers, all of the above manifestations of uncertainty are
included in a larger the category known as hedges. Oxford Dictionaries
(retrieved on Feb. 16, 2016c defines this usage as a "word or phrase used
to avoid overprecise commitment", Dictionary.com (retrieved on Feb. 16,
2016b) lacks the noun form, but as a verb describes to hedge as "to avoid
a rigid commitment by qualifying or modifying a position so as to permit
withdrawal." Merriam-Webster (retrieved on Feb. 16, 2016c) defines hedge
with a slightly ominous twist: as "a calculatedly noncommittal or evasive
statement."
The use of the moniker hedge is attributed to Lakoff [1973], who used this
term to mean any lexical or grammatical form which indicates fuzziness in
natural language. Using the mathematical theories of Lotfi Zadeh (the intel-
lectual grandfather of imprecise mathematical theory, discussed previously in
Chapter 2) as a basis, he defines a broad spectrum of lexical and grammatical
elements in natural language which indicate any softening of the formulation
of propositions, such that they express vagueness or imprecision:
For me, some of the most interesting questions are raised by
the study of words whose meaning implicitly involves fuzziness
 words whose job is to make things fuzzier or less fuzzy. I will
refer to such words as `hedges'. [Lakoff, 1973, p. 471]
Figure 3.1 below shows a list of some elements that he considers hedges;
it should be noted that since his focus in this initial paper was on category
membership (prototype theory), related phenomena in this context appear
to be such elements as a real or a regular, the usage of which emphasizes
the strength of membership in a classification (e.g., a real hero); these forms
would most likely not considered hedges now.
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Figure 3.1: Lakoff's list of hedges and related phenomena [1973, p. 472]
Since Lakoff's first article, the definition of hedging has shifted to focus
on expressions of uncertainty or commitment on the part of the speakers.
However, as with many areas of research, there is not necessarily complete
agreement on what hedge means. Below we describe a few of the various
viewpoints. Holmes [1982] does not specifically use the term hedge but fo-
cuses on epistemic modality and, in particular, looks at the major grammat-
ical classes which are generally now considered to be hedges such as modal
verbs, lexical verbs, adverbial constructions, etc. She also defines the two
terms boosters and downtoners:
In general, lexical devices used to express strong conviction can
be described as Boosters, whereas those used to signal the speaker's
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lack of confidence or to assert something tentatively can be char-
acterized as Downtoners. Boosters strengthen or increase the
illocutionary force of utterances while Downtoners weaken or re-
duce their force.[Holmes, 1982, p. 18]
Prince et al. [1982] look at hedges more in the original sense of Lakoff
and classify them in two main categories: relational hedges that have to do
with the speaker's relation to the propositional content, and propositional
hedges that introduce uncertainty into the propositional content itself. They
further break the two types of hedges into four different types: (1) rounders,
which show approximate ranges for quantitative information (e.g., about 10,
roughly a dozen); (2) adaptors, which suggest the similarity of non-identical
cases (e.g., sort of, a kind of); (3) plausibility shields, when the speaker is not
fully committed to the assertion or the assertion is not based on deductive
logic but plausible reason (e.g., seems like, appears to be); and (4) attribution
shields, when the speaker attributes the assertion to another person or object
(e.g., according to).
Chafe and Nichols [1986] defines hedges more narrowly as one of several
categories of evidentials, which he defines quite broadly as any linguistic ex-
pression or attitude toward knowledge (see Chapter 4 for a fuller discussion
of evidentials):
• reliability of knowledge: maybe, probably, surely, undoubtedly;
• knowledge as having been arrived at through some kind of reasoning,
e.g., obvious, must, should
• knowledge as having been derived from a particular kind of evidence
(sensory evidence or hearsay. e.g., see , hear, feel, it sounds like, it
seems, supposed to be
• hedges: sort of, kind of, etc.
Biber [1988] sees hedges in a broader scope and picks up on Holmes' idea
of downtoners but with a slightly different twist:
Hedges are informal, less specific markers of probability or uncer-
tainty. Downtoners give some indication of the degree of uncer-
tainty; hedges simply mark a proposition as uncertain. [Biber,
1988, p. 240]
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For Hyland [1998], with a particular focus on scientific writing:
. . . hedging refers to any linguistic means used to indicate ei-
ther a) a lack of complete commitment to the truth value of
an accompanying proposition, or b) a desire not to express that
commitment categorically. [Hyland, 1998, p .1]
Hyland uses the term booster, in the original sense from Holmes, as a
counterpoint to hedging but has replaced her downtoner with hedge. Ac-
cording to Hyland, boosters allow writers to project a credible image of au-
thority, decisiveness and conviction in their views. This definition is shared
by Vázquez and Giner Vazquez and Giner [2009], who follow Hyland's lead,
arguing that boosters are used to support persuasion.
In his 2000 paper, Hyland provides some examples of boosters and hedges
that he used in the course of his study as shown in Figure 3.2:
Figure 3.2: Examples of boosters and hedges from Hyland's study [2000,
p. 184]
Hyland also points out that hedges may be used for politeness or deference;
in other words, they may have social meaning rather than being indicators
of uncertainty:
Hedges such as might, probably and seem signal a tentative as-
sessment of referential information and convey collegial respect
for the views of colleagues. Boosters like clearly, obviously and
of course allow writers to express convictions and to mark their
involvement and solidarity with an audience. [Hyland, 2000,
p. 179]
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Furthermore, Hyland [1994] includes several other phenomena in his def-
inition of hedging, including passive voice, conditionals (if-clauses), question
forms, impersonal phrasing and time reference. Particularly in scientific
writing, the use of passive voice and impersonal phrasing are widely, almost
universally, used, conveying an undertone of but I might be wrong or have
overlooked something. With regard to impersonal phrasing, Hyland writes,
. . . the writer inevitably uses a wide range of depersonalized forms
which shift responsibility for the validity of what is asserted from
the writer to those whose views are being reported. Verb forms
such as argue, claim, contend, estimate, maintain and suggest oc-
curring with third person subjects are typical examples of forms
functioning in the way, as are adverbials like allegedly, reportedly,
supposedly and presumably.[Hyland, 1994, p. 240]
Clemen [1998] defines hedging thus:
Die Hecke (das Hedging) ist ein interaktionales, der Diskurs-
analyse zuzuordnendes Sprachmittel in der gesprochenen und
geschriebenen Kommunikation. Sie hat eine pragmatisch-kommunikative
Funktion und erlaubt dem Sprecher/Schreiber,
• seine Aussagen zu subjektivieren
• seine Verantwortung für den Wahrheitsgehalt der Proposi-
tion zu relativieren
• den Grad seiner Gewißheit oder seines Zweifels über die Gel-
tung einer Feststellung einzuschränken
• absolute Aussagen zu vermeiden
• Verantwortung für Äußerungsinhalte zu transferieren
• persönliche Einstellungen zu bekunden und Sachverhalte zu
bewerten,
womit er sich Rückzugsmöglichkeiten verschafft, Unsicherheiten
verbergen kann, das Risiko des Irrtums minimiert, einen poten-
tiellen Einwand des Rezipienten antizipiert und das interperson-




Der sprachlichen Fixierung der Hecke dienen im wesentlichen
lexikalische Mittel aus demModalwort-, Modalverben und Modal-
partikelbereich, epistemische Operatoren, abmildernde (more fuzzy)-
und als einstellungsspezifische Indikatoren bekräftigende (less fuzzy)-
Markierungen, reservierte, vage und reduzierte Verantwortungsüber-
nahme ausdrückende Lexeme undWendungen, Geltungseinschränkung
bewirkende hypothetische Formulierungen, hypothetische Notwendigkeit
ausdrückende Konstruktionen mit performativen Verben und ein-
stellungsbekundende Adverbien und Adjektive. [Clemen, 1998,
pp. 15]
Vassileva [2001] looks at hedging in terms of commitment and detachment
of the writer and includes classes of boosters termed as `solidarity' (the case
when the author claims shared knowledge with the audience) and `belief'
(when the author states unequivocally that he/she is absolutely convinced
of what he/she is saying).
Pappas [1989] describes hedges as belonging to qualifiers, that is, they are
indicators of the level of approximation and speaker commitment to the main
assertion. Under this description, probably, appear, partially, or a tendency to
are classified as hedges, while Pappas uses the term intensifier where other
authors use booster, namely, as elements which reflect speaker confidence.
In her work exploring linguistics patterns which express uncertainty in
conceptual relations, Marshman [2008] separates modal verbs (can, could,
may, might, should, etc.), from hedges (more or less, roughly, somewhat,
mostly, essentially, very, especially, exceptionally, often, almost, practically,
actually, really, etc.). Interestingly, she also designates negative construc-
tions as being a source of uncertainty.
Crompton [1997] defines a hedge as an item of language which a speaker
uses to explicitly qualify his/her lack of commitment to the truth of a propo-
sition he/she utters. In an early attempt to find common ground as to what
hedges are, he examined the viewpoints of various authors regarding hedges,
and then proposed the following characterisations of hedged propositions:
1. Sentences with copulas other than be.
2. Sentences with modals used epistemically.
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3. Sentences with clauses relating to the probability of the sub-
sequent proposition being true.
4. Sentences containing sentence adverbials which relate to the
probability of the proposition being true.
5. Sentences containing reported propositions where the au-
thor(s) can be taken to be responsible for any tentativeness
in the verbal group, or non-use of factive reporting verbs
such as show, demonstrate, prove. These fall into two
sub-types:
(a) where the authors explicitly designate themselves as re-
sponsible for the proposition being reported;
(b) where authors use an impersonal subject but the agent
is intended to be understood as themselves.
6. Sentences containing a reported proposition that a hypoth-
esized entity X exists and the author(s) can be taken to be
responsible for making the hypothesis. [Crompton, 1997,
p. 284]
Like Hyland, Crompton is focused on academic and scientific writing,
commenting,
It seems that there is a danger of hedge being used as a catch-all
term for an assortment of features noticed in academic writing.
Clearly, the use of impersonal construction, passivization, lexis
expressing personal involvement, other politeness strategies, and
factivity in reporting/evaluating the claims of other researchers
are important issues in academic writing; these all seem wor-
thy of further research to enhance the teaching of the subject.
However, the restriction of hedge to designate language avoiding
commitment, a use which corresponds closely, as we have seen,
with the ordinary use of the word, seems desirable and feasible,
both theoretically and pedagogically. [Crompton, 1997, p. 286]
Prokofieva and Hirschberg [retrieved Sep 15, 2015] define hedges as spec-
ulative cues which can be a single word or a combination of multiple words
that signal uncertainty, a lack of precision or non-specificity, or an attempt
to soften or downplay the force of the speaker's utterance. They also point
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out that not all speculative language is necessarily a hedge, using hypothet-
icals as examples of a non-hedging speculation. However, they also make
the point that conditional or speculative formulations are not always to be
considered as hedging:
Hypotheticals such as `If it rains, I won't go to the game' contain
instances of speculative language (if/then) but are not consid-
ered instances of hedging behavior. [Prokofieva and Hirschberg,
retrieved Sep 15, 2015, p. 1]
In order to identify hedge cues, they propose asking three questions as a
litmus test:
• Is the speaker being deliberately uninformative (or under-informative)?
• Is the speaker uncertain?
• Is the speaker trying to downplay the force of their utterance? [Prokofieva
and Hirschberg, retrieved Sep 15, 2015, p. 1]
Since the focus of their paper is on the annotation of hedges in text, they
provide very detailed explanations on the identification of various types of
hedges and their scope: multi-word, negated, disfluent and hedges in ques-
tions with a focus on application.
While not using the specific linguistic terms such as hedge, Liddy et al.
[2004] have developed a conceptual, four-level model of certainty developed
with a focus on reported information (newspapers, journals, etc.), which
captures a number of the concepts in the preceding discussion. In particular,
their three contextual dimensions (later refined upon by Rubin [April 2007])
cover topics of interest for us. Dimension 2 (Perspective) differentiates
between the writer's point of view and third party information; third party
perspective differentiates between that of participants (e.g., direct witnesses)
and experts (e.g., subject matter experts).
Dimension 3 (Focus) essentially separates fact from less reliable content
such as hearsay, opinion, etc. As with Hyland, they include time (tense) as
a fourth dimension also contributes: while future events may be of interest
to us, until they have become past events they are uncertain: I may state
I will go to the conference next month, but that is before I end up sick in
the hospital. I might regularly attend a meeting every Wednesday, but next
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Figure 3.3: Explicit certainty categorization model based upon reported in-
formation model from [Rubin, April 2007, p. 142], expanding upon initial
work by Liddy et al. [2004]
week I have to travel, so I will not be there. Depending upon the application
using the information which is being extracted, future events, or projection
based upon habitual behavior may be of great interest (for example, if the
application is predictive)  or of no interest whatsoever. In either case, tense
may play a role.
3.5 Uncertainty for this thesis
It is clear from the above that we are once again confronted with the same
words being used in different ways by various authors, sometimes varying
only by degree and sometimes varying fairly dramatically. Some authors
focus on both content-based hedges (e.g., some, few, many), where others
focus only on those constructs which reflect on the strength or weakness of
the commitment of the writer to the proposition. Some researchers write of
boosters and downtoners, others of boosters and hedges. Some researchers
include elements such as verb tense and voice, hearsay and mindsay, and
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politeness strategies.
For our purposes within this thesis, we will define the following:
• Hedges are sentence elements which:
1. reflect the reliability of knowledge, including adverbs (e.g., maybe,
probably, surely, undoubtedly), verbs (should, might, appear), ad-
jectives (possible, likely), nouns (possibility, likelihood)
2. flag the knowledge as having been arrived at through some kind
of reasoning, (e.g., assume, infer, conclude, must), or
3. flag the knowledge as having been derived from a particular kind
of sensory evidence or hearsay, (e.g., see, hear, feel, it sounds like,
it seems, supposed to be).
• Boosters are lexical elements which intensify (boost) the hedge. For
example, adding the booster very to likely increases the strength of the
original.
• Downtoners are lexical elements which weaken the hedge. For example,
adding the downtoner somewhat to likely will weaken the original.
It should be noted here that direct observation in the first person is not
considered a hedge: unless we doubt the source  only tangientially an aspect
of the work in this thesis  we take direct first person observation at its face
value. However, reports of direct observation by other individuals would be
considered hearsay.
Exactly how these concepts will work together will be discussed and




Modality, or Epistemic Stance?
When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, `it
means just what I choose it to mean  neither more nor less.'
'The question is,' said Alice, `whether you can make words mean so many
different things.'
'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, `which is to be master  that's all.
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass [1872, p. 72]
What's in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell
as sweet.
William Shakespeare , Romeo and Juliet

4.1 Overview
At the end of the previous chapter, we indicated that the focus of the work
in this thesis would be on the various lexical elements contained in a sen-
tence which provide us clues as to the veracity of the propositional content
in that sentence. One of the important tasks when proposing a new method-
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ology or concept is the careful selection of the nomenclature which will be
used to describe its components. The first step in such a selection is the
examination of existing terms to determine their applicability to the new
concept. In some happy instances, there is an existing moniker which fits
perfectly. However, it often happens that there is no immediately apparent
candidate. There may even be disagreement among researchers as to how
to classify related concepts; for some, the various elements may be classified
in discrete, separate categories, while others may be lumped together in dif-
ferent configurations. Even when the clustering may be virtually identical,
it may not necessarily appear under the same designator. Thus, as happens
in such cases, one must discuss the various alternatives and determine the
appropriate terminology for the topic at hand.
In this chapter we will examine a trinity of related concepts: epistemic
modality, evidentiality and epistemic stance. Depending on the focus and
background of the researcher, these terms may be applied differently: for
some researchers, these terms may be considered to be three separate (but
often closely related) concepts, for others, these are three names for more or
less the same thing.
Particularly for English, which, as we discuss below, contains none of the
specialized grammatical forms expressing evidentiality existing in a number
of other natural languages such as Tuyaca from Columbia (Barnes [1984]) or
Quechua from Peru (Weber [1986]), relying instead on a lexically-based ev-
idential strategy to accomplish this purpose, it turns out that these three
names can be viewed as three facets of the same phenomenon. This phe-
nomenon is central to this work, and hence it is worth investigating these
topics in some depth. This discussion will provide the basis for the selection
of terminology which will be used during the remainder of this thesis.
4.2 Epistemic modality
Fintel [2012] defines modality as a category of linguistic meaning having
to do with the expression of possibility and necessity. Modality may be
expressed in a variety of ways in English: modal adverbs (possibly, proba-
bly), modal verb auxiliaries (should, must), semi-modal verb forms (ought
to, need to), adjectives (possible, likely), nouns (possibility, likelihood), and
constructions such as conditionals (if. . . then).
48
Epistemic modality is the subcategory which expresses possibility or ne-
cessity based upon the knowledge of the speaker. [Halliday, 1970, p. 349]
describes it as the speaker's assessment of probability and predictability.
It is external to the content, being a part of the attitude taken up by the
speaker: his attitude, in this case, towards his own speech role as `declarer'.
Bybee and Fleischmann [1995] and Palmer [1986], among others, view epis-
temic modality as indicating the speaker's commitment to the proposition.
This has often been interpreted as meaning that epistemic modality (as well
as other types of modality) represents the speaker's belief as to the veracity
of the proposition.
As stated above, epistemic modality expresses possibility or necessity
based upon the knowledge of the speaker, it is not surprising that hints
about where the speaker has derived the knowledge may be implicit in many
forms of epistemic modality. For example, in the statement It's 7 o'clock,
John might be home now, the use of might could be seen as indicative of
assumption or inference on the part of the speaker. This interpretation of
might can be viewed as a slide into the direction of evidentiality, which,
narrowly defined, is an indication of the source of the information contained
in the proposition as defined by Aikhenvald [2004]. Taking a wider view
of evidentiality, Westmoreland [1998] argues that may and might should
not be considered as modals expressing necessity and possibility at all but
should be considered as evidentials. [Rooryck, 2001b, p. 166] agrees that
evidentiality may piggyback on other constructs  which he dubs invisible
evidentiality  and provides some examples of this using modals verbs in
German and Dutch as markers of hearsay:
(20) Es soll bisher vier Tote gegeben haben.
(21) Jan zou in het geheim naar Brazilië geëmigreerd zijn.
This blurring of the boundaries and inconsistent interpretation between
epistemic modality and evidentiality is not unusual. For example, SIL's Lin-
guaLinks defines epistemic modality as a modality that connotes how much
certainty or evidence a speaker has for the proposition expressed by his or
her utterance [retrieved Jun 10, 2015]. Further, SIL classifies evidentiality
and judgmental modality as subsets of epistemic modality  judgmental
modality being defined by them as an epistemic modality that connotes the
speaker's strength of inference, or degree of confidence in the reality of the
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proposition expressed by his or her utterance. However, the definition SIL
offers for evidentiality is an epistemic modality that connotes the speaker's
assessment of the evidence for his or her statement. An evidential is a form,
such as a verbal affix, that is a grammatical expression of evidentiality. By
restricting this definition to a form, such as a verbal affix, the number of
languages in which evidentiality appears is reduced, and, more importantly,
English is not in this group. Therefore, one could argue that, under this def-
inition, evidentiality simply does not exist in English, and, as a result, there
is only epistemic modality.
According to Nuckolls and Michael [2014]:
. . . we can probably attribute the conflation of evidentiality and
epistemic modality that was characteristic of early work on evi-
dentiality to the fact that speakers of languages that lacked gram-
maticalized evidentials found it difficult to understand evidentials
as anything other than a proxy for epistemic modality, which was
a familiar category to them.[Nuckolls and Michael, 2014, pp. 13-
14]
DeHaan [1999] sees the two concepts as completely distinct:
While the literature on the subject makes it appear at first glance
obvious that evidentiality and epistemic modality are closely re-
lated, there is just as much evidence, if not more, to cast serious
doubt on this analysis. It is not the case that evidentiality is a
subcategory of epistemic modality. Rather, we are dealing with
two distinct categories: one, evidentiality, deals with the evidence
the speaker has for his or her statement, while the other, epis-
temic modality, evaluates the speaker's statement and assigns it
a commitment value. [DeHaan, 1999, p. 25]
But, as we will see in the following section, it turns out, there is not only
disagreement about whether evidentiality is or is not a subset of epistemic
modality (or indeed vice versa), there is also disagreement as to exactly
what evidentiality is or is not. The following section gives an overview of
discussions on this topic.
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4.3 Evidentiality
Despite their morphological similarity, the linguistic concept of evidential-
ity is not necessarily related to the idea of evidence in the usual, common
sense of the word. Oxford English Dictionary defines evidence as the avail-
able body of facts or information indicating whether a belief or proposition
is true or valid retrieved Apr. 4, 2015. Websters defines it as [t]hat which
makes evident or manifest; that which furnishes, or tends to furnish, proof;
any mode of proof; the ground of belief or judgement; as, the evidence of
our senses; evidence of the truth or falsehood of a statement retrieved Apr.
4, 2015 and WordNet's definition includes Your basis for belief or disbelief;
knowledge on which to base belief retrieved Apr. 4, 2015. Rather, it is
generally agreed that evidentiality has to do with the source of the infor-
mation conveyed in the proposition and, depending on who you read, also
on the speaker's certainty about that information. Just as there is discus-
sion about whether evidentiality is a type of epistemic modality or not as
described above, there is a discussion as to what does, or does not, belong
to the concept evidentiality.
The study of evidentiality in languages first appeared in the middle of the
20th century. Boas [1947] is credited with the first mention of this concept in
his discussion of the Kwakiutl language, in which he identifies a small group
of suffixes express[ing] the source and certainty of knowledge. He used
evidential to describe one of the suffixes in the group. It was, however,
Jakobson [1957] who gave the first definition of evidential: a tentative label
for a verbal category which takes into account three elements  a narrated
event, a speech event and a narrated speech event. . . namely the alleged
source of the information about the narrated event. Jakobson recognized
four sources of information: retelling another person's narration (hearsay
or quotative evidence), a dream (relative evidence), a guess (presumptive
evidence) and one's own experience (memory). There is no conveyance of
proof of the veracity or lack thereof in the assertion being made. Rather,
evidentiality identifies where the knowledge contained in the statement has
come from. Depending upon the author and/or language in question, there
are different types of evidentiality. Willett [1988] defined several types of
evidentiality. Aikhenvald expanded upon his definitions while ignoring others
to produce a slightly different list.
For the purposes of this thesis, we have collapsed the various types of
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evidentiality identified by different researchers into three basic categories:
• Direct: first person sensory information, which is sometimes separated
into visual and non-visual (auditory, tactile, taste). Some authors such
as Aikhenvald separate these into two separate categories.
• Hearsay: reported evidence from other sources and which includes sec-
ond person and third person information. Under second person, the
writer repeats information from a direct source. Under second per-
son Aikhenvald and others define a more explicit form of hearsay is
sometimes referred to as quotative or mediated, in which the infor-
mation source is explicitly named. In contrast, in third person hearsay,
the writer repeats knowledge from indirect sources which may include
general knowledge, the grapevine or even gossip. Willett includes
folklore as an evidential, which might be interpreted as general knowl-
edge shared by a group of individuals with a given culture. Anderson
[anderson:86] includes general reputation, and myths and history.
• Mindsay: a term taken from Bednarek [bednarek:06] which was coined
in contrast to hearsay, as the knowledge is produced by reasoning such
as inference, in which a conclusion is based on reasoning using tangible
or visual evidence or intangibles such as logic, general knowledge, etc.,
as well as personal or emotional components such as belief, conjecture
or assumption. It should be noted that hearsay may contain mind-
say, in that the writer might report (hearsay) the opinion (mindsay) of
another person.
Over time, the concept of evidentiality slowly became of increasing inter-
est to scholars, and, not surprisingly, began to be defined in different ways.
There are essentially two schools of evidentiality. The first school, rep-
resented most strongly by Aikhenvald [2004], sees evidentiality as simply
the expression of the nature of the source of the knowledge. In particular
Aikhenvald and others in this camp focus predominantly on the grammat-
ical forms used to convey this source information. While only a minority
of natural languages contain such forms, many indigenous languages in the
Americas (such as the previously mentioned examples from South America,
Tuyaca and Quechua) have quite sophisticated grammatical systems for ex-
pressing information about the source of information, including hierarchies
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of trustworthiness of the sources. As we have seen from the SIL example in
the previous section, some researchers belonging to this group believe that
the languages without grammatical forms have no evidentiality, others (in-
cluding Aikhenvald) believe that such languages are capable of expressing
evidentiality via evidential strategies which use lexical elements and other
formulations to identify the source of the knowledge. English belongs to
those languages which have no grammatical forms for the expression of ev-
identiality, so it relies on the usage of various lexical elements to represent
this information.
The second school of evidentiality considers that evidentiality conveys
not only information about the source of the content of the proposition
but also expresses the speaker's judgment about the reliability of that con-
tent. According to Chafe and Nichols [1986], [e]vidential markers are defined
as grammatical categories which indicate how and to what extent speakers
stand for the truth of the statements they make.
Rooryck [2001a] expands upon this:
Evidentials indicate both source and reliability of the informa-
tion. They put in perspective or evaluate the truth value of a
sentence with respect to the source of the information contained
in the sentence, and with respect to the degree to which this truth
can be verified or justified. This justification can be expressed
by markers referring to immediate evidence on the basis of visual
observation, to inference on the basis of (non)observable facts, to
deduction or inference, etc. [Rooryck, 2001a, p. 125]
Similarly, in the oft-cited definition by Anderson [Anderson, 1986, p. 274]
it is said that evidentials give "the kind of justification for a factual claim
which is available to the person making that claim" and this indication of
evidence has to be the primary meaning of the evidential structure. Nev-
ertheless, not all linguists agree with this one and only meaning given to
evidentiality. On the one hand there is a consensus that "[t]he basic char-
acteristic of linguistic evidentiality is the explicit encoding of a source of
information or knowledge (i.e. evidence) which the speaker claims to have
made use of for producing the primary proposition of the utterance" [Diewald
and Smirnova, 2010, p. 1]. According to Willett [1988], this view corresponds
to evidentiality in the narrow sense, because an explicit relationship between
evidentiality and modality is denied.
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For Biber and Finegan [1989], Ifantidou [1986] and others, the identifica-
tion of source and the writer's assessment of the reliability of the knowledge
expressed in the statement are considered intertwined.
DeHaan [1999] disagrees with this linkage:
. . . epistemic modality and evidentiality both deal with evidence,
but they differ in what they do with that evidence. Epistemic
modality evaluates evidence and on the basis of this evaluation
assigns a confidence measure to the speaker's utterance. This ut-
terance can be high, diminished, or low. An epistemic modal will
be used to reflect this degree of confidence. An evidential asserts
that there is evidence for the speaker's utterance but refuses to
interpret the evidence in any way.[DeHaan, 1999, p. 4]
He adds further:
. . . evaluation is obviously done on the basis of evidence (which
may or may not be expressed overtly, or which may or may not be
expressed by means of evidentials), but there is nothing inherent
in evidentials that would compel us to assign an a priori epistemic
commitment to the evidence.[DeHaan, 1999, p. 25]
While this statement may be applicable in the case of languages in which
evidentials are grammatical elements, the inclusion of information concerning
the source in languages such as English with no (mandatory) grammatical
evidential forms can be regarded to be a significant comment on the speaker's
judgment regarding the proposition. In other words, since there is no gram-
matical requirement to include this information, one can assume that the
speaker had a reason to do so. Frajzyngier [1985] states the different man-
ners of acquiring knowledge [that evidentials denote] correspond to different
degrees of certainty about the truth of the proposition. In a language in
which such information is added voluntarily, this may be taken as a clue to
the commitment of the speaker. Only through interpretation of the form in
which this information has been presented will we be able to assess what
the speaker's intent in adding this information has been: to distance himself
from the proposition, to provide more authority (in order to convince the
listener), to wish to remain neutral.
The discussion in this section clearly demonstrates that there is disagree-
ment among researchers as to what does or does not constitute evidentiality.
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Once again, we are presented with no clear guidance as to the perfect classi-
fication for our purposes, although many of the arguments, including those
of Rooryck [2001a], in particular but also Biber and Finegan [1989], Ifanti-
dou [1986], and Anderson [1986] support the inclusion of both the (original)
source of and the writer's assessment of the reliability of the information
under evidentialitiy.
In the following section, we investigate epistemic stance as a third and
final alternative concept.
4.4 Epistemic Stance
Stance is a broader concept than either evidentiality or epistemic modal-
ity  indeed some argue that stance subsumes them both, as well as other
constructs which we have discussed in previous chapters. Precht [2003], for
example, claims stance subsumes hedges, evidentiality, vague language, atti-
tude, affect and modality. Nordquist [retrieved Jun 13, 2015] defines stance
more loosely as [l]inguistic and non-linguistic forms and strategies that show
a speaker's commitment to the status of the information that he or she is
providing.
Biber and Finegan [1989] define stance as the lexical and grammati-
cal expression of attitudes, feelings, judgments or commitments concerning
the propositional content of a message. They examined a variety of charac-
teristics that fall under their definition of stance, identifying six interpretive
types, which stance characteristics are most distinctive to each of these types,
and in which varieties of text these distinctive characteristics are most likely
to be found. Their analysis of stance characteristics is shown in Figure 4.1.
The linguistic expression of attitude, the authors continue, has been
studied under two main topics: evidentiality and affect. [Biber and Finegan,
1989, p. 92] They define evidentiality following Chafe's inclusion model, i.e.,
as reflecting the writer's expressed attitudes towards knowledge: towards its
reliability, the mode of knowing and the adequacy of its linguistic expres-
sion.[Chafe and Nichols, 1986, p. 271] Affect, in contrast, reflects personal
attitudes on behalf of the writer, including emotions, moods, expectations
and (non-epistemic) judgments such as surprise or disappointment.
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Figure 4.1: Stance styles according to Biber and Finegan 1989, p. 116
Some researchers extend stance to cover other phenomena in human com-
munications. Fairclough [1992] considers that stance markers may also define
relationships between writer and reader, including defining the power hierar-
chy or indicating solidarity. For example, an expression of uncertainty may
not necessarily reflect uncertainty about the content of the proposition on
the part of the writer, but rather his timidity as the weaker partner in the
communication.
Marin-Arrese [2009] focuses on a subset of stance, which she calls epis-
temic stance:
Epistemic stance refers to the knowledge of the speaker/writer re-
garding the realization of the event and/or to his/her assessment
of the validity of the proposition designating the event. Linguis-
tic resources for the expression of the various forms of stance
include modal, evidential and attitudinal expressions. [Marin-
Arrese, 2009, p. 23]
She further subdivides epistemic stance into three parts: epistemic modal-
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ity, personal evidentiality and mediated evidentiality, and, interestingly for
us, assigns reliability classifications to several examples, as shown in Fig-
ure 4.2 below.
Figure 4.2: Epistemic stance according to Marin-Arrese 2011, p. 793
The concept of mediated evidentiality, that is, indirect evidentiality via
secondary sources, is particularly of interest. The strategy of using (and
often naming) other external sources to provide strength to an argument,
thereby legitimizing both the proposition and the resulting argumentation,
is widely used. Indeed, this thesis itself is filled with such references; without
these external citations, the value of the results would be called severely into
question. White [2006] refers to the practicing of using experts, prestigious
social status or widely accepted information as sources as giving the propo-
sition evidential standing. Interestingly enough, this shifts the burden of
the truth of the proposition elsewhere, although the speaker may invoke any
of the many other means at her disposal to represent her commitment to the
credibility of the proposition.
Once again, we are reminded of the interconnectedness of all three con-
cepts on which we have focused, while at the same time it is clear that there
is no consensus among researchers as to their meanings.
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However, we need a single term for that which we are investigating in
this thesis. Therefore, the following section discusses possible alternatives,
and proposes a solution.
4.5 And the winner is. . . .
The focus of this thesis is on the analysis of lexical items which indicate un-
certainty about the truth of the propositional content of an utterance. For
the purposes of this thesis, in order to provide cohesion and avoid unneces-
sarily redundant references, we need to either define a new term entirely or
to select one of the three which have been discussed above.
Before we begin this final discussion, we should note two important
points:
• While one may fundamentally view the work of this thesis as trying
to determine the truth of a proposition by examining linguistic clues
contained within a sentence, it should be viewed more subtly. There
are a number of communications which are neither true nor false, for
example, when the event being described has not yet happened, where
we wish to make a judgment as to whether we believe it might be true
at some (later) point. Since the results of this work will be used to
support decision-making under uncertainty, we are trying to assess the
strength or weakness of the proposition, rather than its truth, based
upon information the writer has embedded within the sentence.
• The work being presented in this thesis, while oriented toward appli-
cation, in particular, in the area of information fusion, and therefore,
the consumers of the results of this research may well come from non-
linguistic backgrounds; thus a compromise between that which may
satisfy a linguist and that which makes sense to, say, a computer sci-
entist or a modeler is desirable. Therefore, while various researchers in
linguistics may disagree with this choice of nomenclature, we ask them
to keep this point in mind.
These points having been made, we may proceed with our discussion of
options for the selection of an appropriate descriptor for our purposes.
One of the possibilities is to examine descriptors other than those listed
above as a candidate. Many words are already in use within the area of ap-
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plication for which this work is designated. For example, as we will discuss in
Chapter 5, the descriptor belief function has a specific, well understood and
widely used meaning in the area of applied mathematics called Dempster-
Shafer which is very widely used in the domain of information fusion. Since
the results of the work done in this thesis will very likely flow into mathe-
matical models based upon this mathematical system, it would be confusing
for practitioners. It likewise makes little or no sense to assign new meaning
to such a term (or even its abbreviated form belief.
Similarly, while words such as credibility and reliability spring to mind
as likely candidates, they too are problematic within one major area of ap-
plication (intelligence) for which this work is intended. In the intelligence
community, reliability refers solely to the source of information, and is rep-
resented by six pre-assigned values which all users understand. Similarly,
credibility is used with the intelligence community to designate the "truth-
fulness" of the information content that a source has delivered; while this
appears to be the ideal designator for our work, credibility likewise has six
pre-assigned values (one of which is essentially cannot make a judgment)
which practitioners in the field use. Furthermore, as we have discussed in
Chapter 3, uncertainty about the propositional content of a sentence relies
both upon the source of that content, as well as other lexical markers of un-
certainty with which the source surrounds the proposition, using one of these
terms to represent both concepts (source and content uncertainty) would be
confusing for practitioners. Therefore, these two terms are also suboptimal
for our purposes.
However, returning to the three concepts presented earlier in this chapter,
there is one term which would fit both of the criteria mentioned above:
being understandable for non-linguist consumers, but likewise acceptable to
linguists. This candidate is evidentiality.
From the non-linguist point of view, the strongest argument for eviden-
tiality is its morphological similarity to evidence, a word which is commonly
understood among English speakers. Re-examining the definitions of evi-
dence discussed at the beginning of Section 4.2, and adding a new one, we
find that certain elements of these definitions apply perfectly to the first of
our points above:
• the ground of belief or judgement [Webster's Online Dictionary re-
trieved Apr. 4, 2015]
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• basis for belief or disbelief [WordNet retrieved Apr. 4, 2015]
• ground for belief [American Heritage Dictionary retrieved on Aug. 23,
2014]
While linguists disagree as to what does or does not fall under the cate-
gory evidentiality, there are a number of researchers (e.g., Chafe and Nichols,
Rooryck, Biber and Finegan, Ifantidou) who support the idea that, to once
again quote Rooryck,
[e]vidential markers are defined as grammatical categories which
indicate how and to what extent speakers stand for the truth
of the statements they make. Evidentials illustrate the type of
justification for a claim that is available to the person making
that claim. [Rooryck, 2001a, p.125]
Therefore, in light of the conditions which we outlined at the beginning of
this section, and the ensuing discussion, as well as the foreseen application of





A reasonable probability is the only certainty.
E.W. Howe [1926, p. 23]
Million to one chances crop up nine times out of ten.
Terry Pratchett Mort [1987]
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5.1 Introduction
Identifying and understanding the types and sources of uncertainty present in
textual information is only one step toward using this information for decision
making. Most models using this information are based upon mathematical
algorithms to calculate the reliability of the results. Thus, it is not enough to
simply identify that a statement is uncertain and in which way it is uncertain,
we also need to assign some sort of (quantitative) value to each piece of
information which reflects our perception of its accuracy.
Over the past centuries, mathematicians, philosophers and logicians have
attempted to create mathematical models to represent and  even more
importantly  predict uncertainty and risk in the real world. One of the
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first significant models for uncertainty has been Bayesian Probability, the
foundations of which go back to Thomas Bayes in the seventeenth century.
The principles of Bayesian probabilities originally was created to support
betting hypotheses, predictions of the outcomes of rolling dice or of drawing
a particular hand of cards.
Until the twentieth century, the Bayesian view of the world was expanded
upon, but never essentially departed from. However, with the explosion of
research in discrete and applied mathematics, and based upon new needs
driven by developments such as computer science and artificial intelligence,
a number of new theories and models for the representation of uncertainty
arose.
In 1965 things changed when Lofti Zadeh [1965] presented an extension to
classical set theory called fuzzy sets. In classical set theory, the membership
of an element in a given set was defined in a crisp binary, either-or,
true/false fashion: the element was a member of that set or it was not.
However, in real life, boundaries are often not as clear-cut: elements can sort
of belong to a set. Depending upon their characteristics, some elements may
be held to be more representative of a given set than other elements. Less
representative elements may have membership functions in more than one
set, because they lie in boundary regions and kind of belong to more than
one set.
There are numerous approaches to mathematically formalizing uncer-
tainty. In Figure 5.1, Klir and Smith [2001] divide various theories into
additive (classical numerical probability), and nonadditive (everything else).
Kohlas and Monney [1994] further subdivide the nonadditive theories into
non-standard probability theories and non-probability models. Non-standard
probability theories include, but are not limited to, the Dempster-Shafer
theory of evidence (Shafer [1976]), the Hints models (Kohlas and Monney
[1995]), the upper and lower probabilities models (developed by numerous
researchers including Good [1950] and C.A.B. Smith [1961], etc.). From the
concepts underlying fuzzy set theory sprang a number of non-probabilistic
mathematical models. In [1978], Zadeh extended his fuzzy set theory into
possibility theory, which was itself later further extended into belief functions
by Dubois and Prade [2001] and the transferable belief model by Smets and
Kennes [1994].
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Figure 5.1: Classification of uncertainty theories [Klir and Smith, 2001,
p. 10]
Finally, although not a mathematical theory per se, we will discuss the
representation of uncertainty by odds, an alternate representation of proba-
bilities used by statisticians and probabilists, as well as gamblers (although
there are some differences in implementations). This representation along
with the linguistic formulations it generates are often used both by layper-
sons and experts to express uncertainty. As a result, it is worth a short
excursion into this more informal representation.
5.2 Probability theories
Probability theory is one of the two classical theories of uncertainty, aris-
ing in the mid-17th century through the works of mathematicians such as
Pascal, Fermat, Huygens and through actuarial work of deWitt, Hudde and
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Graunt Smets [July 2, 1999]. For some two hundred years, probability theory
remained the sole theory for representation and calculation of uncertainties,
extended and further by numerous mathematicians including Euler, Laplace
and Bayes. During the 20th century, new needs led to the development of
competing theories, some, such as possibility theory, were based upon prob-
ability theory, others such as fuzzy sets broke new ground.
Probability theory is well-documented as a methodology for formalizing,
and calculating uncertainties, with a plethora of texts describing the basics.
However, though many lay people tend to use probability in the sense of
a single concept, there are in fact four sub-theories which describe different
situations. These are discussed in depth in Smithson [1993].
In each case the basic premises of probability theory remain intact:
• There exists a finite set of mutually exclusive outcomes.
• Each outcome is assigned a specific likelihood and the sum of those
likelihoods within the set of outcomes is 1.0 .
Probability theory and its variations continue to play a major role in the
evaluation of risk. One major reason for this is that there are comprehensive
axiomatic foundations for these theories. A second reason is tractability: a
numerical result can be quickly and easily determined using these methods.
5.2.1 Classical probability theory
The original definition of probability theory was based upon the idea of a
set of equally possible events  the flip of an (unbiased) coin, the tossing of a
(fair) die, or drawing a playing card from a (complete and unmarked) deck 
in which the likelihood of a single given outcome was derived by the division
of 1 (the sum of all outcomes) by the number of elements, i.e., 1/6 for each
possible outcome of the throw of a die whose faces each contain a unique
symbol. The universe of the set is known, the set of outcomes is known.
5.2.2 Relative frequency theory
In this variation of probability theory, the elements within the set of out-
comes are not assumed to be equally likely. Each element of the set is as-
signed a likelihood based upon its relative frequency as established through
numerous independently repeated trials. That is, the likelihood is not based
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upon absolute knowledge as in the classical theory, but upon heuristics de-
veloped through observation over time. In other words, occurrences of the
desired event in question relative to all events will be counted over time and
used as a basis to determine the probability of the desired event occurring
in the future will be determined.
5.2.3 Subjective (Bayesian or personal) probability
In contrast to the two preceding theories, this variant of probability the-
ory is not based upon either knowledge or observation of the universe, but
based upon one's subjective belief that a specific outcome (event) will oc-
cur. Therefore, it is personal to the individual assigning the probability to
the outcome, and hence probabilities arising from this are considered to be
degrees of belief or an individual's personal opinion as to the probability
of each event.
Subjective probability is widely used for the expression of opinion or
interpretation. Very often the assignment of a probability to a possible
future event is based upon a personal, sometimes emotional, not always
rational belief as to the likelihood of that event occurring. For example, a
sports fan can make assign a subjective probability to the likelihood of his
favorite sports team winning the championship even before the season has
begun, based not only on factors such as previous performance or changes
in team membership but also on irrational factors such as it's about time
for them to win again. Thus the weighting of the belief about this outcome
may vary widely from fan to fan, depending on the factors each individual
uses to generate the probability.
5.2.4 Logical (a priori) probability
Whereas classical probability assigns probabilities of single events based upon
complete knowledge of the universe under consideration (e.g., the faces of
a die), the logical schools assign probabilities based upon the evidence at
hand. Keynes [1962] defines a priori probability as a logical relation between
a proposition and a corpus of evidence. Using logic rules we can derive a
new hypothesis using information which we already know and our assump-
tions about this information. The probabilities which result are considered
logical because they are entailed by (inductive) logic. In this sense, logi-
cal probability may therefore also be considered objective, in contrast to
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the pure subjectivity of Bayesian (personal) probability. It should be noted,
though, that because assumptions are involved, logical probabilities are nec-
essarily subjective to a certain extent.
Regardless which variation used, one thing is common to all flavors of
classical probability: a single precise value assigned to a single event. This
single value also allows for additive manipulation of results to describe more
complex behavior.
However, it has long been accepted that it is difficult, if not impossible or
impractical, to force the assignment of a single value to events which are not
so discrete. It is one thing to assign a single value to each potential outcome
of a coin toss, it is another thing to assign a single value to events which do
not have strict demarcations such sick or partly cloudy. With the first,
we have complete knowledge of all possible (discrete) outcomes  heads or
tails  and can make predictions based upon these. In the determination of,
say, the health of farm animals, the determination of the states sick and
healthy are not so clear. Assigning a single (numerical) value is much more
difficult, if not just downright impossible.
To summarize these succinctly, according to according to Hajek [2012]:
Broadly speaking, there are arguably three main concepts of
probability:
• A quasi-logical concept, which is meant to measure objec-
tive evidential support relations. For example, in light of
the relevant seismological and geological data, it is proba-
ble that California will experience a major earthquake this
decade.
• The concept of an agent's degree of confidence, a graded
belief. For example, I am not sure that it will rain in Can-
berra this week, but it probably will.
• An objective concept that applies to various systems in the
world, independently of what anyone thinks. For example,
a particular radium atom will probably decay within 10,000
years.Hajek [2012]
In each of these statements, the probable can be associated with a
distinct percentage: there is a 75% chance that California will experience a
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major earthquake, or a 30% chance that it will rain in Geneva. Or I may be
90% certain that my favorite team will go to the playoff finals this year.
However, in real life, it is seldom so clear cut. Even though we speak of a
75% likelihood, what we really mean is that it is much more likely that there
will be a major earthquake in California than not. Just as fuzzy set theory
was created to provide an alternative to the binary set allocation of classical
set theory, it became necessary to build other mathematical theories and
models to deal the messiness of real life. In the 20th century, mathematicians
began to develop theories of imprecise probabilities that allow us to model
the world using imprecise, uncertain and incomplete data.
5.3 Classification and Set Theories
Traditionally, we think of sets as groups or collections of elements which
somehow belong together. This belonging together is based upon some
sort of defined relationship which is defined by specific characteristics which
the elements share. Based upon these characteristics things being examined
are determined to belong or not to belong to a given set. One can consider
such a set to be classification based upon specific characteristics shared by the
elements of the set. In classical set theory, set membership is clearly defined
 an element is either in a given set or it is not  and the interrelationships
between various sets may be easily determined.
While this approach may work for many types of elements, there are many
more instances where such an approach will not work. The lines between
sets may be blurred, or the elements themselves are not clearly delineated.
For example, the values red, orange and yellow are not clearly delineated:
there may be questions as to the boundaries between the values (i.e., at
what point does red become orange?). These boundaries between the con-
cepts red and orange are vague; there is a certain arbitrariness to assigning
any sort of crisp delineation between the two concepts, which is, to a great
extent, dependent upon personal opinion. Labov's classic discussion 1973 of
categories, prototypes and classification discuss this topic in great detail
There are two main approaches to dealing with vague membership in
sets. The first, and most well-known, is fuzzy set theory. This was proposed
by Zadeh in 1965 when he introduced a variation of set theory to deal with
vagueness. The basis of his work relies on the concept that an element may
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belong only partially to a set. For example, a height measurement of 2 meters
for a human being would be universally considered tall; however, does an
individual of height 180 cm also fall into this category? Or one of height 175
cm? Is the latter more likely to be considered a member of the set medium
height? The element under consideration will be assigned a value ranging
between 0 and 1 which determines the degree to which that element belongs
to a given set. The membership of an element at the union or intersection
of more than one set is determined based upon its individual memberships
in each of the sets under consideration.
Figure 5.2 illustrates how various fuzzy concepts such as few, many, and
some can be mapped. While the arguments can be made that none and all
should be viewed as crisp values (0% and 100% respectively), these graphics
illustrate that none may in fact be almost none, and all may be nearly all.
Figure 5.2: Representations of fuzzy concepts such as few, many, and some
from [Zimmer, 1984, p. 126]
It should be noted that, because the value given for the degree of mem-
bership is between 0 and 1, it is sometimes erroneously viewed as the proba-
bility that the element belongs to this set, rather than a measure of the im-
precision of the classification of the element to a specific set. In other words,
the membership value 0.75 assigned to a given element does not mean that
the element belongs 75% to this set and 25% to another, but rather that it is
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not as representative of the set as those elements with higher memberships
(generally, it tends toward a boundary of the set).
It should also be noted that there are numerous ways in which mem-
bership functions may be assigned. Smithson [1993] has determined four
approaches to this:
• Formalist: in which lower and upper bounds (0 and 1) for member-
ship are agreed upon and defined solely in mathematical terms, with
intermediate membership values defined by a smooth function;
• Probabilist: the degree a membership of an object is the (possibly
subjective, possibly through polling) probability that it belongs to the
set;
• Decision-theoretic: the degree of membership is defined by the utility,
or payoff, of asserting that the object does indeed belong to the set;
• Fundamental measurement: numerical memberships assigned are quan-
titative which behave like fractional counts, based upon axiomatic con-
ditions which can be shown empirically.
The second approach to imprecision and sets is rough set theory, which
was proposed by Pawlak [1982]. Rough sets differ from fuzzy sets in that
imprecision is expressed by a boundary region of the set, and not membership
in the set. Rough set theory determines those elements which are inarguably
in the set and those which are inarguably not in the set (the upper and lower
approximations of the original set), and identifies a boundary region, which
contains all of those elements which may not be definitively defined as in or
not-in the set under consideration. If the boundary region is empty, then
the set is considered to be crisp, i.e., there are no elements which cannot
be clearly identified as either belonging to or not belonging to the set and
therefore no ambiguity.
Intuitively one can see that for applications using natural language, a
representation such as fuzzy or rough sets for imprecise concepts is a very
useful tool. This is particularly so in that human beings often disagree on the
classification of concepts; imprecise representation is excellent for reflecting
this diversity.
In the following sections we will examine some of these theories briefly.
Again, it must be noted that the purpose here is not to provide a rigorous
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mathematical representation of each theory presented, but rather to provide
the reader with a sampling of some of the more important theories and
their variants, which will function as a basis for later discussion within this
paper.
5.4 Theories of Imprecise Probabilities
The field of imprecise probabilities is expanding rapidly. New theories emerge,
while there are increasingly more variations, refinements and expansions of
existing theories. In Figure 5.3 below, Klir and Smith [2001] offer a snap-
shot of imprecise probability theories ordered according to their levels of
generality.
Figure 5.3: Classification of uncertainty theories from [Klir and Smith, 2001,
p. 18]
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This graphic gives some idea of the range of focus of these different theories.
In the following subsections we look at several theories which are widely
used.
5.4.1 Possibility Theory
Possibility theory is similar to probability theory, but is an extension of fuzzy
set theory rather than classical set theory. The first reference to a Theory
of Possibility was proposed by Zadeh [1978], who originally intended to
use this for representing gradations in natural language formulations such
as those used in fuzzy sets, although others such as the philosopher David
Lewis and L.J. Cohen prepared much groundwork.
Dubois and Prade [2003] describe the concept of possibility with four
characteristics:
• Feasibility: it is possible to do something (physical)
• Plausibility: it is possible that something occurs (epistemic)
• Consistency: compatible with what is known (logical)
• Permission: it is allowed to do something (deontic) [Dubois and Prade,
2003, slide 4]
In possibility theory the middle two characteristics are of interest: how
plausible an event is, and how consistent it is with information that we al-
ready have. Therefore, where probability theory is based upon crisp proposi-
tions, that is, where the probability of a given event is represented by a single
(crisp) number, possibility theory is based upon two concepts: the possi-
bility and the necessity of an event. The possibility of an event represents
the extent to which the event is consistent with the information which we
have, while the necessity expresses the extent to which the event is definitely
implied by the knowledge, i.e., the extent to which our knowledge indicates
it must be so. The possibility measure provides an upper bound (every-
thing that might be), while necessity provides a lower bound (everything
that must be). Using these two measures allows us to represent partial belief
and ignorance and therefore the ability to reason with imprecise probabilities
Dubois et al. [2000].
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5.4.2 Theory of Evidence (Dempster-Shafer)
The Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence (DST) can be viewed as a gen-
eralization of subjective probability (Shafer [1976]). Its strength lies in its
assignment of probabilities to sets, thereby allowing it to represent ignorance.
It is also able to cope with varying degrees of precision without difficulty.
In fact, when the precision reaches the point that sets all become singletons
(i.e., each contains only a single element), DST effectively collapses back into
Bayesian probability.
The use of Dempster-Shafer is to test hypotheses for which there is at
least some support from the available evidence. There are three central
functions to DST. The first of these is the basic probability assignment (bpa),
which refers not to the classical assignment of probability but rather defines
the mapping of the power set (that is, all subsets of the set of hypotheses,
including the empty set and the set itself) to the interval between 0 and
1 where the bpa of the empty set is 0, while the sum of the bpas of all
subsets of the power set is 1. The second function is the Belief function,
which represents the sum of the masses of all subsets that at least partially
support the hypothesis being tested, thereby forming a lower bound. The
third function is Plausibility which is 1 minus the sum of the masses of all
subsets whose intersection with the hypothesis is empty (that is, they show
no support at all for the hypothesis). This forms an upper bound.
Central to this theory is the set, called the frame of discernment, which
contains all possible (distinct) values for the variable under consideration.
While the elements in the frame of discernment may be numerical (generally
an interval), they may often be other sorts of values. For example, the frame
of discernment d for the variable h which represents the variable height may
be defined as d = { tall, normal, short in which the values are fuzzy
representations rather than numbers.
Each of these elements will be assigned a numerical measure of belief
(generally an interval) by a knowledgeable source (e.g., expert). Similarly,
a value expressing a level of belief may be assigned to any subset of d. For
example, we can define a subset H, where H = { tall, normal }, that is given
a belief equivalent to the statement the value of h is tall or normal.
Under probability theory, in which the collective beliefs for a propo-
sition must sum to 1.0 (100%), if a numerical value w is assigned to a
proposition which is a subset of d, the remainder of one's belief (1 - w)
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is automatically assigned to the complement of that subset to assure the
summing to 1.0. In Dempster-Shafer, one is allowed to leave this remainder
uncommitted as an indication of lack of knowledge. This seems a trivial dif-
ference, but is important when combining evidence: uncommitted does not
automatically act as evidence against the hypothesis. The strength of this
approach is that it supports a certain intuitive approach to the handling of
uncertainty, which has a certain pragmatic appeal. Furthermore, it supports
the combination of evidence for a specific hypothesis; the Dempster Rule of
combination is a powerful part of this theory.
Dempster-Shafer, it should be noted, is very widely used for the repre-
sentation of uncertainty. There are a number of variations on the Dempster-
Shafer theme, including Theory of Hints (Kohlas and Monney [1994]) as well
as the Transferable Belief Model (Smets and Kennes [1994]), which is dis-
cussed briefly in the next section. The ability to combine uncertain evidence
makes DST very interesting. However, researchers do not agree on how this
should be done: there are a number of different variations including Yager
[1986], Inagaki [1991] and Zhang [1994].
5.4.3 Transferable Belief Model
Smets and Kennes [1994] have proposed a variant to DST which utilizes
belief functions, albeit in a different fashion than DST. The Transferable
Belief Model is based upon the following:
• a two-level model: there is a credal level where beliefs are entertained
and a pignistic level where beliefs are used to make decisions.
• at the credal level beliefs are quantified by belief functions.
• the credal level precedes the pignistic level in that, at any time, beliefs
are entertained (and updated) at the credal level. The pignistic level
appears only when a decision needs to be made.
• when a decision must be made, beliefs at the credal level induce a
probability measure at the pignistic level, i.e. there is a pignistic trans-
formation from belief functions to probability functions. [Smets and
Kennes, 1994, p. 3]
Smets and Kennes claim that one significant difference from DST is that
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the Transferable Belief Model does not at any time reduce to a probabilistic
model as does DST.
5.5 Odds
While not a formal mathematical theory similar those discussed above, odds
are an alternative representation of relative probabilities. This may also be
seen as the ratio of favorable and unfavorable outcomes. Odds are expressed
as a ratio of two numbers in the form x to y, with alternate forms x/y, x-y or
x:y in which to is substituted by a symbol. When this ratio is described as
odds in favor the ratio represents the probability that the event will occur,
while odds against describes the converse. Rather than stating, as in a previ-
ous example, that there is a 75% probability that California will experience
a severe earthquake in the coming year, using odds we can represent this as
3 to 1 odds in favor of an earthquake. (Odds for and odds on are alternate
expressions for the same thing). If there is a roughly 50% chance of occur-
rence, the expression even odds may be used to describe the probability, or,
somewhat more often the description will be a 50/50 chance or 50/50 odds.
Odds often feel more natural or are more convenient to use in certain in-
stances. For example, describing the probability of a lottery win as 1:460,000
is more understandable for most people, than the corresponding probability
expressed as a decimal with many zeros behind the decimal point. As a
result, the representation of probability has been integrated into everyday
language. In fact, in his original article Sherman Kent (1964) anecdotally
relates the use of odds by his analyst colleagues (see Chapter 1).
5.6 Conclusion
While this is not a complete overview of mathematical representations of
uncertainty, it does demonstrate that there are essentially two categories
of representations  those which deal with crisp (discrete) values and those
which deal with fuzzy values  and that within each of these categories
there are various systems which are currently being used by researchers and
practitioners. Ideally, we would find a solution to our problem which could
be represented under both classes of systems. It turns out that our model
will in fact accommodate both.
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The next steps are to look at the work which has been done up to now in
quantifying  that is, assigning numerical values to  the uncertainty which
appears in the domain of natural language utterances, as well to identify






Solum ut inter ista vel certum sit nihil esse certi.
Pliny the Elder, The Complete Works [2015, p. 130]
When one admits that nothing is certain one must, I think, also admit that
some things are much more nearly certain than others.
Bertrand Russell, [1949, p. 115]

6.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3 we narrowed our scope down to hedges  all those elements
within a sentence which convey some information as to how the main in-
formational content was derived and which indicate the commitment of the
speaker to that information content  our focus now turns to how to assign
to that content numerical weights representing the evidential value of that
content, which can then be used in algorithms.
[Schrage, February 20,2005, p.B01] notes
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[a] growing number of fields ranging from medical diagnostics
to Internet spam filtering [. . . ] increasingly rely upon Bayesian
analysis  a probability theory that predicts the likelihood of
future events based on knowledge of prior events  as a powerful
tool to weigh new evidence.
Bayesian (subjective) probability, as we have seen in the previous chap-
ter, however, is only one of many mathematical theories which are used to
represent and combine uncertain information.
In this chapter we take a look at some of the work which has been done
thus far in assigning numerical values to evidential expressions. As we will
see below, this earlier work tends to focus almost exclusively on certain types
of hedges, in particular expressions containing modal verbs (should, could,
might), other verbs indicating conviction or another source (believe, doubt,
according to, assume, guess), adverbs (possibly, probably, likely), adjectives
(it is possible, probable) and some nouns (possibility, likelihood). In most of
these studies, attempts have been made to ascertain numerical values for
the various expressions, generally by asking participants in a study to locate
the expression along a scale, from, say, 0 to 100 or to assign a percentage.
Furthermore, hedges, as noted in Chapter 3, are often strengthened or weak-
ened by the use of boosters and downtoners (very likely, rather improbable),
requiring appropriate adjustmenst to their assigned values.
Other types of hedges, for example, those dealing with informational
source such hearsay, conjecture, inference, etc., may often be ranked relative
to each other in a hierarchical sense, but there appear to have been no
attempts to assign numerical values to the evidentials in this category.
To make things even more complex, hedges do not always appear alone
in a sentence: I believe it is possible that Mary could be. . . ; Clausen found
that uncertain sentences often contained multiple hedge cues, sometimes up
to 4 or more.[2010, p. 124] Therefore, we often must try to assign a weight
to the proposition which is based upon the interaction of multiple hedges.
One solution is to determine, in advance, all possible combinations of
hedges, boosters and downtoners and assign them individual values. This
would be a brittle solution, broken as soon as a combination does not appear
in the table of values. Luckily, Crompton [1997, p. 284 points out that com-
pounding of hedges is quite common, but the elements of each compound
are still distinguishable; the reader can easily corroborate Crompton's as-
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sertion in the example from the preceding paragraph (I believe it is possible
that Mary could be. . . ). Recognizing this provides us with a basis to sup-
port a more robust solution, which is to determine the weights assigned to
individual hedges and assign a composite weighting.
However, as we will see, ultimately the numerical values per se are irrel-
evant, in so far as there are no definitive universally true numerical values
assigned to any of these hedges. Indeed, in the examples that follow one may
clearly see that various researchers have used their own different (arbitrary)
weighting scales, resulting different weight values and ranges for the same
hedges.
What does, however, appear to be universally true, as we shall see in the
following sections, is the general ordering in which humans tend to organize
the various hedges with their accompanying boosters and downtoners. This
is of particular significance to us, as it allows us to assign relative weighting
while at the same time freeing us from being tied to a specific mathematical
weighting system. In other words, it allows us the freedom to assign, for
example, single evidential value (crisp weights) or a range of values (fuzzy
weights) to any given hedge or chain of hedges depending on the underlying
application which is being used.
6.2 Words of estimative probability
There are many applications in which the processing of large volumes of
unstructured text-based information is of great importance, among these
are law enforcement, crisis management, business intelligence, state and na-
tional security, as well as the military in both conflict and non-conflict (e.g.,
peacekeeping) activities. In particular, as decisions made based upon such
applications may be quite literally life-or-death, it is very important that the
law enforcement, national security and military consumers of such gathered
information be very focused on its reliability. Therefore, it should come as
no surprise that much of the research in analyzing information quality comes
from the national security and military side.
As briefly discussed in Chapter 1 (and repeated here for the convenience
of the reader), in his 1964 article about what he refers to as words of es-
timative probability (WEPs), Sherman Kent [1964] of the United States
Central Intelligence Agency relates the following anecdote about an intelli-
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gence report concerning the possibility of a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia:
A few days after the estimate [NIE 29-51, "Probability of an
Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951] appeared, I was in informal con-
versation with the Policy Planning Staff's chairman. We spoke
of Yugoslavia and the estimate. Suddenly he said, "By the way,
what did you people mean by the expression `serious possibility'?
What kind of odds did you have in mind?" I told him that my
personal estimate was on the dark side, namely, that the odds
were around 65 to 35 in favor of an attack. He was somewhat
jolted by this; he and his colleagues had read "serious possibility"
to mean odds very considerably lower. Understandably troubled
by this want of communication, I began asking my own colleagues
on the Board of National Estimates what odds they had had in
mind when they agreed to that wording. It was another jolt to
find that each Board member had had somewhat different odds
in mind and the low man was thinking of about 20 to 80, the
high of 80 to 20. The rest ranged in between. [Kent, 1964, p. 2]
What makes this anecdote particularly interesting is that the various indi-
viduals with whom Kent spoke were all individuals who were working in the
same domain (intelligence), who most likely had similar educational back-
grounds and, presumably, who also similar training for their analyst posi-
tions. In spite of all this, this anecdote shows us that hedges are open to
interpretation.
Intrigued by this phenomenon, another CIA analyst Jr. [1999] performed
an informal study and requested a number of colleagues to assign a single
probability to a number of commonly used hedges. Figure 6.1 shows the
hedges along with a mapping of the various probabilities assigned to each
hedge.
The probabilities assigned to a number of the hedges were clustered very
closely (better than even, about even, highly unlikely). A number varied quite
dramatically: highly likely ranged across a span of more than 40 percentage
points, as did improbable, probably not and chances are slight, while the range
for probable started at 25% as the lower bound to just over 90% as the upper
 a spread of more than 65 percentage points.
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Figure 6.1: Probabilities assigned by CIA analysts to various hedges. [Jr.,
1999, p. 155]
Staying within the analyst realm, Rieber [2006] requested analysts train-
ing at the Kent School (named after Sherman Kent) to assign ranges of
percentages instead of specific values to a number of hedges. The results are
shown in Figure 6.2.
Again one can see that the ranges of percentages range from quite narrow
to relatively large, but the ranges are not necessarily identical to those in
the first chart, even for identical hedges (compare probable in both). One
can almost assume that giving the task of assigning probabilities for hedges
to any random group of English-speakers will result in somewhat different
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Figure 6.2: Ranges of percentages assigned to hedges by analysts in training
[Rieber, 2006, p. 3]
numerical ranges.
In the decades since Kent's initial work, the US intelligence community
has continued to struggle to standardize the terminology which they used to
assess situations, in order to reach a common understanding of the meaning
of those terms.
Ultimately, the intelligence communication settled on a standard spec-
trum of WEPs as shown in Figure 6.3 .
Figure 6.3: Words of Estimative Probability, as displayed in the front matter
of several other recent intelligence products. via [Friedman and Zeckhauser,
2015, p. 15]
Using these standardized words, Wheaton [2008] had students assigning
values to each of these words of estimative probability. Each student is first
requested to indicate a single value for each term to represent the probability
associated with that term. Then students were requested to indicate a range
by identifying the lowest probability associated with each term as well as
the corresponding highest probability. The results are shown in Figure 6.4
below.
In the literature from the linguistic side, there has been quite a bit of re-
search done in which values are assigned to many expressions of uncertainty;
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Figure 6.4: Chart based on information derived from information gathered
by students. Series represent the average high score, the average low score
and the average point value for each WEP, as well as an idealized trendline.
[Wheaton, 2008, p. 9]
in particular modal adverbs or expressions are well represented. Indeed,
there are many tables to be found in which columns of values for many that
look finding numerical values which have been collected through surveys.
However, in most cases, the goal of assigning numerical values to prob-
abilistic expressions was the means to an end, rather than the end in itself,
as was the case with the examples above.
Weighting differences also appear when differing content domains are ex-
amined. The examples above were derived from the intelligence community,
which actively evaluates information based upon its credibility. Examining
the wider population, and, in particular, gathering information in different
content domains gives insight into the consistency, or lack thereof, of the use
of hedges.
Brun and Teigen [1988] investigated the numerical weights of probability
expressions in three separate contexts: usage in videotaped television news
reports, discussions of medical treatment effectiveness (pediatrician/patient
parents conversations) and opinions on current events. Their focus was on
the evaluation of not only of weighting differences between various domains
(medicine, news, opinion columns), but, in the case of the medical discussion,
also the differences between the understanding of the expressions between
the players in the conversation (doctors, parents of the sick children). The
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values assigned are shown in Figures 6.5 and 6.6. The information contained
in these two figures shows a strong consistency in the rankings even when
different domains and contexts are involved.
Figure 6.5: Probabilites ratings in the context of medical treatment [Brun
and Teigen, 1988, p. 397]
Within the context of current events discussions, Brun and Teigen carried
out a much more detailed analysis, involving three separate groups with three
separate tasks, the results of which are shown in Figure 6.7:
Group I (n = 16) was presented with the long list of probability
phrases and asked to state the numerical probabilities (percent-
age certainty) associated with each verbal expression in the list.
To assess the perceived ambiguity of the phrases, the subjects
were also asked to judge how well they thought others would
agree with their estimates. This was done by indicating within
what limits they would expect to find the estimates of 90% of a
large sample of respondents from the general population engaged
in the same task. Finally, they were asked to select those phrases
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Figure 6.6: Weights assigned to probabilistic expressions used in televised
news reports. [Brun and Teigen, 1988, p. 401]
they would consider to be the best probability expressions.
Group II (n = 24) received the shorter list of 14 probability items
along with a response sheet with empty spaces for 0, 10, 20,. . .
100% certainty. The subjects were asked to place each of the
probability expressions next to the most appropriate number.
Group III (n = 24) received the set of 14 complete probabilistic
statements (context condition). The subjects first estimated the
numerical probabilities (percentage certainty) associated with
the underlined probability words used in the sentence, i.e., the
probability intended by the source of the communication. Next,
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the subjects gave their own opinions on the subject matter by
stating the numerical probability that they personally felt in each
case was most appropriate, regardless of the probability phrase
actually used in the sentence. [Brun and Teigen, 1988, p. 392]
Figure 6.7: Results of Brun and Teigen's three-part testing numerical esti-
mates of expression of uncertainty and perceived ambiguity [1988, p. 393]
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Renooij and Witteman [1999], whose interest in the quantification of
probabilistic expressions comes from the field of (Bayesian) computer mod-
elling in medicine, evaluated three groups: medical students, other students,
and the first two groups combined. Figure 6.8 below shows the resultant
weightings:
Figure 6.8: Co-ordinates and calculated probability points for the eight ex-
pressions of group 1, medical students (n = 26), group 2, other students (n =
52) and all subjects together (n = 78) [Renooij and Witteman, 1999, p. 23]
From the information recapped in Figure 6.8, they created the simplified
probability scale shown in Figure 6.9.
Figure 6.9: Final scale with seven categories of probability expressions plus
their calculated probability points. [Renooij and Witteman, 1999, p. 24]
Beylage-Haarmann [2010] takes a slightly different tack and compares the
weighting of a small number of words of estimative probability by Americans
and their cousins across the Atlantic. While in Figure 6.10 there are some
differences, it turns out that they are not sufficiently significant to be of
interest:
Bei perhaps und probably gibt es . . . größere Abweichungen zwis-
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chen den beiden getesteten Gruppen. Ebenso gehen die Ein-
schätzungen bei certainly und maybe etwas auseinander. Die
Analyse der Abweichungen ergibt jedoch keine Signifikanz für un-
terschiedliche Bewertungen zwischen Amerikanern und Englän-
dern. Des Weiteren ergibt sich kein Unterschied von mehr als 10
Prozentpunkten. Es kann also davon ausgegangen werden, dass
in beiden englischen Dialekten über die Bedeutung der Modalaus-
drücke Einigkeit herrscht.[2010, p. 76]
Figure 6.10: Ranking differences between native speakers from the USA and
UK [Beylage-Haarmann, 2010, p. 76]
Ayyub and Klir [2006] looked at uncertainty modelling in engineering
and the sciences, and presented a ranking of linguistics probabilities and
translations based upon responses from studentis in that field (Figure 6.11).
One thing is eminently clear from all of the examples above: although
there may be slight variations in weighting, and in spite of differences in
the domains from which the test subjects were pulled, there is remarkably
little variation in the ordering of items which appear on multiple lists. From
this, one can quite comfortably conclude that there is a commonly accepted
relative ranking of such words of estimative probability. This we will be able
to exploit for our work.
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Figure 6.11: Words of estimative probability in the sciences and engineering.
[Ayyub and Klir, 2006, p. 154]
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6.3 Hearsay, mindsay and other forms of eviden-
tiality
Whereas the preceding section focused on words of estimative probability,
we will now begin to look at the other ways in which the writer indicates the
content of the proposition may be less than certain.
Wesson and Pulford [2009] have focused on expressions conveying mind-
say  opinion, recollection, belief  which they dubbed expressions of con-
fidence and doubt. Their focus for the quantification is not on identifying
universal values but whether the context of time (past or present) affects
the listener's understanding of the expression. Thus, the assignment of a
numerical value to the selection of hedges is for comparative purposes only.
Their results are shown in Figure 6.12.
Interestingly, they do document some differences in the weighting of ex-
pressions depending on whether those the cues are expressed in past or
present tense. However, careful comparison of the values (M) which they
have listed shows that, with very few exceptions, the ordering of the expres-
sions remains identical regardless of tense.
Not all researchers have attempted to assign numerical values per se, but
to examine relative strengths, in fact, assigning fuzzy values such as we saw
in the preceding chapter rather than precise numbers.
Goujon [2009], who focuses on information extraction, uses Liddy et al.'s
model (cf. Chapter 3) as a basis, and has assigned several linguistic forms the
fuzzy values low, moderate or high (Figure 6.13). He has also included
some representative examples of both the categories and the rankings.
Not only lexical elements will affect our perception of the truth or untruth
of a statement. The source from which that information is derived also plays
a role. As Frajzyngier [Frajzyngier, 1985, p. 250] comments, the different
manners of acquiring knowledge correspond to different degrees of certainty
about the truth of the proposition.
Willett [1988] proposed the following ranking in his study of various lan-
guages which have grammaticalized forms of evidentiality (in its narrowest
definition, indicating the source of information, see Chapter 4 for a discus-
sion).
personal experience < direct (sensory) evidence < hearsay (6.1)
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Figure 6.12: Wesson and Pulford's weighting with focus on the effects of time
(present, past) on listeners' rating of expressions of confidence and doubt.
2009, p. 154
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Figure 6.13: Goujon's analysis of linguistic forms representing uncertainty
based upon the work of Liddy et al. (cf. Chapter 3) 2009, p. 120
DeHaan [2001] proposed a cross-linguistic comparison of source eviden-
tiality:
sensory < inferential < quotative (6.2)
One could easily argue that there is an implicit weighting of the informa-
tion from different types of sources in such a hierarchy. For example, while
it is generally acknowledged that direct perception (e.g., I saw) is more
reliable than conveying hearsay (he told me), there has been no attempt
to portray this difference by assigning to these expressions relative numeri-
cal values (such as we have seen with the hedges in the preceding sections)
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so that the values could be used to assign a numerical or fuzzy reliability
weight for the information contained in the proposition, i.e., lower the weight
to reflect somewhat more uncertainty or doubt.
Returning to a table we discussed in Chapter 4 (shown again here for the
reader's convenience), we see that Marin-Arrese [2011] uses fuzzy designators
("high reliability," "medium validity", as well as "certainty", "probability",
etc.) rather than numerical values to rank various epistemic and evidential
expressions as shown in Figure 6.14.
Figure 6.14: Fuzzy weightings for modality and evidentiality markers.
[Marin-Arrese, 2011, p. 793]
Of interest are the elements under her designator mediated evidentiality
in which she differentiates various forms of third-party information (hearsay).
It should be clear from the discussion above that the assignment of nu-
merical values (probabilities, odds) to the lexical and grammatical elements
which are of interest to us is not easy. Where it has been attempted, one can
see variations in the values assigned; there are no universally applicable
values. However, what one can clearly see is that these elements may be
ordered along a scale from stronger to weaker (or higher to lower, or more
true to less true, to name just a few possibilities). For example, in general,
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English speakers would agree to the following ordering:
rumor has it < my neighbor told me < numerous studies have shown
(6.3)
which is reflected in Marin-Arrese's column objective attribution: rumor
has it falls under low validity, my neighbor told me (assuming, of course,
that I believe my neighbor to be at least somewhat credible) would fall under
medium validity and the implication in numerous studies have shown is
that the object of the discussion has been scientifically researched gives it a
high validity under the argument authority of source(s).
As there appears to be consistency in the rankings between different
groups of people surveyed on these topics. Thus we can conclude that there
seems to be some sort of universal scalar for the various elements which we
may exploit for our purposes.
6.4 Boosters and downtoners
Following upon the preceding observation about the universality of the rank-
ing of various evidential elements, it should theoretically be possible to order
all evidential elements on a scale. Unfortunately, natural language is very
flexible, and to list all possible combinations of these elements and assign
each combination a value would be difficult to say the least.
However, it turns out that there are some constructs which may assist
us. For example, intensifiers may be used to weaken (downtoners) or to
strengthen (amplifiers) the evidential weight of elements. That is, use of
the downtoner somewhat weakens likely in somewhat likely, and similarly
the booster very will turn likely into the stronger very likely. Assigning a
numerical weight, say, on a scale from 0 (impossible) to 100 (fact) would
result in weights in which this relation is true:
somewhat unlikely < likely < very likely (6.4)
Unsurprisingly, there is the reverse effect when we use somewhat and
very with the modal adverb unlikely :
very unlikely < unlikely < somewhat likely (6.5)
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Basically likely and unlikely are antonymic, thus one might expect, using
logic, that their negations result in identical values for the antonym, i.e.,
unlikely = not likely. In numerous languages including English, unlikely and
not likely are in fact not two exactly equivalent expressions. They are closely
related in that the general weights of the two elements in each pair (unlikely
/ not likely and likely / not unlikely) are nearly identical, but the negated
version is somewhat softened in English. Indeed one could almost say that
negation works as a downtoner on the opposite, i.e., not likely is likely with
a downtoner. The effect of the downtoner is minimal There are also instances
of this phenomenon in Brun and Tiegen the summary in Figure 6.7 above.)
The effect is mo
6.5 Conclusions
Finally, we have seen in the preceding section that rankings of various struc-
tures indicating the type and reliability of the source of information have an
effect on how credible we view the information contained in the proposition,
we can consider such structures to be boosters or downtoners with relation
to the proposition. Thus, rumor has it from the relation described in the
relation 6.5 above can be considered a downtoner, since it weakens the cred-
ibility of the proposition, and as a downtoner it may be assigned a value for
the purposes of calculating an evidentiality score for the proposition.
In the following chapter, we will pull the pieces together to detail a
model for combining various elements to derive a relative evidential scoring
and demonstrate how this may be converted to numerical values, both crisp
and fuzzy, for use in computer-based fusion algorithms.
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Chapter 7
Putting it all together
It appears, from all this, that our eyes are uncertain. Two persons look at the
same clock and there is a difference of two or three minutes in their reading
of the time. One has a tendency to put back the hands, the other to advance
them. Let us not too confidently try to play the part of the third person who
wishes to set the first two aright; it may well happen that we are mistaken
in turn. Besides, in our daily life, we have less need of certainty than of a
certain approximation to certainty.
Remy de Gourmont Philosophic Nights in Paris [1920, p. 127]
Everything is vague to a degree you do not realize till you have tried to make it
precise, and everything precise is so remote from everything that we normally
think, that you cannot for a moment suppose that is what we really mean
when we say what we think.. . . When you pass from the vague to the precise
by the method of analysis and reflection that I am speaking of, you always
run a certain risk of error . . . you cannot very easily or simply get from
these vague undeniable things to precise things which are going to retain the
undeniability of the starting-point.




In the preceding chapters we have examined various definitions of uncer-
tainty in general and in natural language in particular. We have narrowed
down our focus to the sentence level, specifically to the representation of un-
certainty about the content of the sentence as opposed to the representation
of uncertainty within the content.
In Chapter 3 we defined hedges, boosters and downtoners as used within
the framework of this thesis. To reiterate, hedges are various lexical ele-
ments which the speaker uses to indicate the reliability of knowledge in the
statement, which flag the knowledge has have been arrived at through some
kind of reasoning, and which flag the knowledge as having been derived from
sensory evidence or hearsay. Boosters intensify hedges, whereas downtoners
weaken hedges.
The ultimate goal is to enable the assignment of a numerical (evidential-
ity) weight to a proposition in a sentence which represents the reliability of
that proposition based upon the clues the speaker has included in the form of
hedges or by other elements which convey uncertainty such as verb forms like
passive voice, future tense, modal verbs, or subjunctive mood. One way to
achieve this goal would be to anticipate all possible combinations of hedges,
including their modification by boosters and downtoners, as well all other
indicators of uncertainty, and assign each combination a value. However,
this solution would be brittle, if not outright unrealistic: it is easy to miss
out a potential combination. Furthermore, it is not uncommon to find that
a given sentence has multiple expressions of uncertainty.
Additionally, in Chapter 6 we discussed various attempts to assign nu-
merical values to some hedges (e.g., words of estimative probability, and
rankings to others where numerical values are not intuitive (e.g., markers of
hearsay and mindsay). Our conclusion from this discussion was that there
are no universal numerical values (weights) which exist for evidentials such
as hedges and other markers of interest, but there appears to be a sort of
universal ordering of these.
In this chapter, we present a methodology for flexible determination of
the weight given to a proposition based upon lexical clues at the sentence
level based upon the conclusions we drew from Chapter 6, including negation
and a discussion of "toss-ups" and grey areas.
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7.2 Polarity and the point of maximum uncertainty
In the tables we have seen in the previous chapter, words of estimative prob-
ability and other types of hedges were ranked based upon numerical values
assigned by participants in research studies. Different numerical ranges were
used by the different researchers, including a six-point scale and a probability
scale from 0 to 100%.
In general, most readers would say that on these scales that one end of
the range indicates maximum certainty (e.g., 100%) while the other indicates
maximum uncertainty (e.g., 0%). However, this interpretation is erroneous
in a significant way: as we approach 100%, we are indeed increasing certain
that the proposition p must be true, but as we approach 0%, we are not
increasingly uncertain that p is true, but rather we are increasingly certain
that p cannot be true. The point of maximum uncertainty lies elsewhere.
[Holmes, 1982, p. 13] captured this insight:
The following categories provide a relatively simple yet useful
means of describing degrees of certainty expressed in English:
I Certain: speaker asserts with certainty that the proposition
is true or not true.
II Probable: speaker asserts that the proposition is probably
true or not true (i.e., improbable).
III Possible: speaker asserts that the proposition is possibly
true or possibly not true.
A graphical representation of the relationship between these three cate-
gories is shown in Figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1: Scale of certainty which extends from maximum to minimum
certainty concerning the truth or falsity of what is asserted. [Holmes, 1982,
p. 13]
97
When Holmes' scale is opened up with "p is true" at one end of the
scale and "p is untrue" at the other end, we end up with the scale shown
in Figure 7.2.
Figure 7.2: Holmes scale opened up so that p is true lies at one end of the
scale and p is untrue lies at the other.
Thus, the uppermost and lowermost values of the scales represent the
points of maximum certainty, while minimum certainty (maximum un-
certainty) lies in the middle of the range, as shown in Figure 7.3. The point
of maximum uncertainty is the point at which we have no opinion as to the
truth or untruth of p.
Figure 7.3: Maximum uncertainty occurs at the center of the scale, not at
either end.)
Mapping some common hedges onto this scale confirms the observation
that the maximum uncertainty exists in the middle of the scale, indeed as can
be seen in Figure 7.4. Additionally, we can observe the effects of a booster
(very), a downtoner (somewhat), as well as negation (not) on two hedges,
namely, likely and unlikely. It is immediately apparent that the effects of the
booster, downtoner and negation with relation to the scale are not identical
for both hedges. The result of adding very to likely is a compound hedge
98
which lies to the right of the original, that is, closer to p is true. Adding very
to unlikely results in a compound hedge which lies to the left of the original,
that is, closer to p is untrue. The modification of unlikely by the downtoner
somewhat results in a compound which lies to the right of the unmodified
hedge, i.e., closer to the point of maximum uncertainty, the rightward shift
caused by the downtoner is in the same direction that the booster very did for
likely. That is, the shifts caused by boosters and downtoners are dependent
upon which side of the point of maximum uncertainty they lie.
Similarly, negation causes a dramatic change along the scale. If we view
the point of maximum uncertainty as an axis, we can say that negation
of the hedge results in a flip (or, the mathematically more correct term,
reflection) around this axis, thus changing sides with reference to the axis.
However, negation in English is not necessarily clean: while negating likely
results in more or less the equivalent of unlikely, the double negative of not
unlikely is not equivalent to likely in English. It turns out that is in addition
to the reflection with respect to the axis of maximum uncertainty (from left
to right), not unlikely lands to the left of likely, that is, closer to the axis of
maximum of uncertainty, and thus also behaves as a downtoner.
So the problem is how to construct a method which allows for the some-
times rightward-shift, sometimes leftward-shift caused by boosters and down-
Figure 7.4: Overlaying some sample hedges onto the annotated scale.
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toners, as well as for the ability to flip as a result of negation. It turns out
that the solution is relatively simple and lies in viewing the point of maxi-
mum uncertainty as an axis as described above.
Since at the point of maximum uncertainty we have no opinion as to
whether or not p is true or not true, we assign the value 0 to this point.
From there, we assign (increasingly) positive values to those elements which
indicate an increasing certainty that p is true and (increasingly) negative
values to those elements which indicate an increasing certainty that p is
untrue.
Among the various definitions of polarity listed in Merriam-Webster On-
line Dictionary [retrieved on Aug. 23, 2014] can be found the quality or
condition inherent in a body that exhibits opposite properties or powers in
opposite parts or directions or that exhibits contrasted properties or powers
in contrasted parts or directions. Taking the notion of different or con-
trasted directions, we can say that the elements to the right of the point of
maximum uncertainty have positive polarity, and those to the left of that
point have negative polarity as shown in Figure 7.5
Figure 7.5: Using the point of maximum uncertainty as an axis, elements to
the right are said to have positive polarity, whereas elements to the left have
negative polarity.
100
Hedges of the first type, namely lexical elements which the speaker uses
to indicate the reliability of knowledge in the statement (e.g., words of
estimative probability) can be assigned a weight. If the hedge expresses
confidence that p is true, i.e., lies to the right of the axis of maximum un-
certainty, we call it positively-poled and assign it a positive weight between
0 and some upper limit. If the hedge expresses doubt, that is tends to assert
more strongly that p is untrue, we call it negatively-poled and assign it
a weight between a (negative) lower limit and 0 (zero). For example, if we
assign the limits 1.0 to positive polarity and -1.0 to negative polarity, we can
assign likely, which represents confidence, a weight of 0.6, while unlikely is
weighted at -0.6.
As will be seen in the following sections, the idea of polarity will help
us to determine relative ordering of hedges, singularly and in combination,
taking into account not only the effects of boosters and downtowners but
also negation.
7.3 Weighting for relative ranking of words of es-
timative probability
Even though our goal at this point is to achieve a relative ranking, we will
use de facto arbitrarily selected numbers on a scale (in this case the range
from -1.0 to 1.0) to assist us in the process.
In Figure 7.4 several examples of hedges of the type words of estimative
probability (WEPs)  alone, modified by boosters or downtoners, and also
negated  were shown arranged along the scale from p is untrue to p is true.
We will use these hedges as our initial examples.
Since we have already established in the previous chapter that there is
no universal value for a hedge (unless, of course, it is specifically stated
as in a 75% likelihood), we will assign weights to some of the (unmodified)
hedges as follows in line with the scale shown in Figure 7.4, and in line with
the polarities shown in Figure 7.5:
wlikely = 0.6 (7.1)
wunlikely = −0.6 (7.2)
Similarly, there are no universal values for boosters and downtoners.
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However, both types of modifiers vary in the intensity by which they strengthen
or weaken the underlying value of the hedge: for example, extremely pro-
duces a bigger booster effect than very and somewhat has a very weak effect.
Thus, we can assign weights to these modifiers to reflect the relative degree
of modification. For example, the stronger extremely could be assigned an
effect factor of 0.4, while very is assigned 0.3 to reflect its relatively weaker
effect, and somewhat has a relatively minimal effect factor of 0.1.
We can set the generalized form for the effect of a single modifier on the
original hedge to
effectmodifier = 1− (1−m) = m (7.3)
where m is the weight of the modifying booster or downtoner. (It must
be noted here that the expression 1 − (1 −m) seems to have mysteriously
appeared for no apparent reason; however, while superfluous here, this ex-
pression plays a role when there are multiple modifiers present for a given
hedge. ) Thus the formula for the modified weight for a hedge with a single
modifier is:
wmodified hedge = woriginal+p ∗ effectmodifier ∗ (1− |woriginal|) (7.4)
where p is the polarity of the hedge in question and w is the weight assigned
to the hedge. The effect of the term (1  |woriginal|) is to ensure that the
resulting values of the modified hedges do not exceed the maximum limits
(1.0 and -1.0) on the scale. The use of the polarity p is to account for the
differing behavior of the modification depending on the polarity of the hedge:
for example, using a booster on a positively-poled hedge results in a value
to the right of the original, whereas a booster on a negatively-poled hedge
results in a value to the left of the original.
To demonstrate, using the value 0.3 which we assigned to the booster
very to represent the amount we believe the booster increases value of the
hedge it is modifying. When we multiply the weight wlikely by the booster
effectvery we end up with the following result:
wvery likely = wlikely+p ∗ effectvery ∗ (1− |wlikely|) =
0.6 + (1) ∗ (0.3) ∗ (1− |0.6|) = 0.72
(7.5)
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which indicates that very likely ends up to the right of likely as expected.
Similarly, when we modify the weight wunlikely by the booster effectvery
we end up with the following result:
wvery unlikely = wunlikely+p ∗ effectvery ∗ (1− |wunlikely|) =
− 0.6 + (−1) ∗ (0.3) ∗ (1− | − 0.6|) = −0.72
(7.6)
which indicates that very unlikely ends up to the left of unlikely as expected.
To the downtoner somewhat we assign the value effectsomewhat = −0.1,
which, we believe, reflects its weakening (negative) effect on hedges. When
we multiply the weight wlikely by the value effectsomewhat we end up with
the following result:
wsomewhat likely = 0.6 + (1) ∗ (−0.1) ∗ (1− |0.6|) = 0.56 (7.7)
and when we modify the weight wunlikely by the downtoner effectsomewhat we
end up with the following result:
wsomewhat unlikely = −0.6 + (−1) ∗ (−0.1) ∗ (1− | − 0.6|) = −0.56 (7.8)
with the result that very unlikely ends up to the left of unlikely as expected.
Thus the assigned weights result in the following relation:
very unlikely < unlikely < somewhat unlikely <
somewhat likely < likely < very likely
(7.9)
which are illustrated in Figure 7.6 .
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Figure 7.6: Relative weightings of very unlikely, unlikely, somewhat unlikely,
somewhat likely, likely and very likely as determined by the algorithm.
It is not uncommon for humans to concatenate multiple boosters or down-
toners to strengthen or weaken the hedge further. For example, it is quite
common to find constructions such as really very likely which is even stronger
than very likely. To account for concatenation, we need to make a modifica-






where m1, m2, ... are the boosters or downtoners which modify the hedge.
wmodified hedge = woriginal + p ∗ (effectmodifiers) ∗ (1− |woriginal|)
= woriginal + p ∗ (1−
n∏
i=1
(1−mi)) ∗ (1− |woriginal|)
(7.11)
Using this generalized equation, we can now find weights for hedges with
multiple modifiers. Suppose we assign a booster weighting of 0.1 to really.
Expanding upon the above examples of very likely and very unlikely we now
calculate the values for really very likely and really very unlikely :
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wreally very likely =
wlikely + p ∗ (1− effectreally ∗ effectvery) ∗ (1− |0.6|) =
0.6 + (1)(1− ((1− 0.1) ∗ (1− 0.3)))(1− |0.6|) = 0.748
(7.12)
wreally very unlikely =
wunlikely + p ∗ (effectreally ∗ effectvery) ∗ (1− | − 0.6|) =
− 0.6 + (−1)(1− ((1− 0.1) ∗ (1− 0.3)))(1− | − 0.6|) = −0.748
(7.13)
The resulting relative placements are shown in Figure 7.7:
Figure 7.7: Relative weightings of really very unlikely and really very likely
as determined by the algorithm.
7.4 Negation
Negation of hedges is generally straightforward: negating a hedge simply
flips it around the (imaginary) axis of the point of highest uncertainty by
changing its sign, that is, by multiplying by -1:
effectnegation = −1 (7.14)
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Thus, for not likely we end up with:
wlikely ∗ effectnegation = 0.6 ∗ (−1) = −0.6 (7.15)
which is essentially the same as unlikely. In English, however, negation
of a negatively-poled hedge generally ends up as somewhat softer than its
opposite. That is, not unlikely is usually considered weaker than likely and
therefore should be closer to the point of highest uncertainty. Thus, we
can say that, in the case of the negation of a negatively-poled modifier, the
behavior is that of is the sign change (flip) plus a downtoner.
Thus we can differentiate the two:
effectnegation =
−1 if hedge is positively poled−1 + wdowntownernegation if hedge is negatively poled
(7.16)
If we assign the weight of the downtoner associated with negation to 0.2,
the negation of unlikely results in
wunlikely ∗ effectnegation = −0.6 ∗ (−1 + 0.2) = 0.48 (7.17)
thus placing not unlikely to the left of likely and closer to the point of max-
imum uncertainty, indicating its relative weakness, as can be seen in Fig-
ure 7.8.
In order to accommodate for negation of a hedge, we must modify the
equation shown in (7.17) as follows:
wnegated hedge = whedge ∗ effectnegation (7.18)
The reader will note that we have demonstrated that the negation shown
in 7.18 applies to an unmodified hedge, such as likely or impossible. There is
a second instance of negation, namely that of modified hedges, such as very
likely or quite impossible. However, in the case of negation of a modified
hedge, the negation is often applied to the modifier, rather than the hedge
itself. An instance of this is not very likely. Whereas not very likely results
in an equivalent expression to unlikelythe antonym of likely, the modified
hedge not very likely does not result in the antonymic very unlikely, but
rather results in an expression with the same polarity as very likely, but
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Figure 7.8: Relative weightings of unlikely, not likely, not unlikely and likely
as determined by the algorithm.
weaker. In other words, in this case not acts as a downtoner, and thus
should be handled thus.
There are, however, some exceptions to muddy things further. Using as
an example the hedge a high probability, its negation, not a high probability
might be evaluated as a true negation, i.e., the polarity would be flipped.
Handling of such special expressions is left for the implementer to decide.
Thus far we have discussed in some depth those hedges which have either
a positive or negative polarity. There is, however, relatively small set of
markers which indicate maximum uncertainty, i.e., the coin is still in the air.
In our model, these would appear at the boundary between the negatively-
poled and positively-poled would have a numerical value of zero. As we shall
discuss in the following section, the equations which we have developed up to
this point are not able to appropriately handle these markers; an alternative
strategy is required.
7.5 The Toss-ups
There is one place where things function somewhat differently than described
above: the point of maximum uncertainty. Mathematically speaking, this is
107
not a surprise: this point is assigned the value 0, which has neither a positive
nor a negative polarity. This has an effect on our calcualtions. Take, for
example, the following sentence:
(22) The chances of rain tomorrow are 50/50.
Clearly, assigning the weight to the the expression 50/50 is trivial, namely
w50/50 = 0. The problems arise when we begin to make modifications by
using boosters or downtoners.
Returning to our generalized equation for determining the effect of a
booster or downtoner, 7.19 (repeated here for the reader's convenience), we
are reminded, again, that p is the polarity of the hedge in question, m is the
weight of the modifying booster or downtoner and w is the weight assigned
to the hedge.
wmodified hedge =woriginal + p ∗
n∏
i=1
(effectmodifiers) ∗ (1− |woriginal|))
= woriginal + p ∗ (1−
n∏
i=1
(1− (mi))) ∗ (1− |woriginal|)
(7.19)
We can immediately see the problem: since the expression 50/50 lies neither
in the positively polarized nor the negatively polarized regions of our model,
but rather at the (neutral) border between the two, we cannot assign a value
to p other than zero. This would result in a defaulting of a modified toss-up
hedge to its original value  but since woriginal = 0 in the case of a toss-
up, the entire equation reduces to a zero result. This would be appropriate
in the case of a modified hedge such as "very much 50/50", which simply
strengthens the assertion that this is a toss-up. However, there are instances
in which an effect on the toss-up hedge is reflecting through a change in
weight. Examples of this would be "better than 50/50" or "somewhat less
than 50/50". In such instances, the implementer could consider specific
solutions for individual modified toss-up hedges; this level of specificity is
outside of this thesis.
And lastly, as always, negation is also clearly an exception. Taken liter-
ally, not 50/50 should mean any value on the scale which is not 0, regardless
of polarity and regardless of strength. It is doubtful that use of negation for
this hedge is intended to deliver this result; it is not unusual that not 50/50
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is followed by another hedge which clarifies the intent of the speaker, as in
chances are not 50/50 but rather closer to 75%. In such a case, one could
plead that negation of the maximum-uncertainty hedges could be ignored,
with the alternative hedge combinations (better than 50/50, less than 50/50,
etc.) being used for evaluation. (A possible solution would be to try to
identify the alternate expression within the sentence, using that expression
while ignoring the not 50/50  however, this, is is an implementation-specific
solution and thus outside of the scope of this thesis.)
7.6 Hearsay and Mindsay
As discussed in Chapter 6, English speakers generally have little problem
assigning some sort of numerical weight such as, for example, a percentage
to words such as probably, possibly, doubtful, and so on. There are other
expressions in the broader definition of hedge that we are using, namely the
markers of hearsay and mindsay (hedges of types 2 and 3). While there may
be hesitance to assign weights to these markers, they can be broadly, as we
have also seen, ranked in some sort of order, which we will be able to exploit
for our purposes.
One broad statement that can be made about hearsay and mindsay mark-
ers is this: they all weaken the credibility of the information in the proposi-
tion. Consider the following partial statements:
(23) Die Zeit reports that...
(24) According to News of the World. . .
(25) Sources in the White House reported that. . . .
(26) Someone told me that. . . .
Each of these fragments indicates that the propositional information
which follows has originated from a source which is not the speaker. Just as
in the preceding section we will assign weights to the markers which reflect
our belief about their relative weakening influence on the proposition. These
weights can be considered as discounts in that they reflect how much we
deduct from the credibility of the information in the sentence. There may be
two strategies to this assignment of weights. The first of these is simply to
assign a standardized weighting for any information which is judged to have
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come via hearsay. The second strategy is to differentiate between named
sources and anonymous sources, and may include granularity for the named
sources based upon background information such as expertise of the source
or our experience as to the reliability of the source. (It should be noted
that the credibility of various types of sources is, strictly speaking, outside
the scope of this thesis, but is worth mentioning at the juncture. There is
excellent work being done by other researchers such as Rogova and Bosse
[2010] in the field of information quality).
Thus, in (23) we have an example of hearsay, but the original source
is named (identifiable) and is a well-respected newspaper known to be a
provider of reliable information. We miight assign a minimal discount
value of 0.05 (reflecting our belief that we have relatively little doubt) to such
examples of hearsay in which original source of the information is identifiable
and classified as a reliable source. Similarly, in (24) we have an example of
hearsay in which the original source is named (identifiable), but in this case
the original source has been known to often provide dubious information,
and therefore any information provided by this source should be viewed as
considerably less reliable. We might assign a value of 0.30 as a result of
our doubts about the credibility of the information. On the other hand,
in (25) we have an example of hearsay from an unnamed source. However,
although the source is anonymous, it has been identified as being associated
with an organization which quite carefully controls its information flow. We
assign arelatively low discount weight of 0.15, based on an evaluation of
the background of the source (the White House), but the anonymity creates
more uncertainty. As in the previous three examples, in (26) we have hearsay,
but this time we have absolutely no information about the original source.
The case could also be made that the vagueness of somebody is a further
indication of uncertainty on the part of the writer. Therefore we discount
such hearsay quite significantly, for example, at 0.4.
Knowledge of the original source of information is very important to de-
termining the strength of our belief in the credibility of the information being
conveyed. However, it requires much background information about the in-
formation sources, including expertise, knowledge, and credibility in earlier
communications. The acquisition and assessment of such source background
knowledge is beyond the scope of this thesis, therefore, we will simply iden-
tify that the propositon has originated from a source other than the speaker
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and acknowledge that it weakens the proposition generally.
In the following sentences, we present examples of mindsay, indicating
that the proposition was arrived at through a mental process and is not the
result of observation of an actual event.
(27) I believe that...
(28) I inferred that...
(29) I imagine that...
(30) I doubt that...
The weights assigned to each of the mindsay hedges in the above examples
will vary according to implementation; however, one would expect to see that
the weighting for each will reflect its relative uncertainty (based, for example,
upon the ordering discussed in Chapter 6).
Figure 7.9: Example of relative weightings of various hearsay and mindsay
markers.
Further, it should be noted that in the case of doubt, the mindsay marker
has a negative polarity. Compare, for example, the following statements:
(31) I believe that it will rain tomorrow.
(32) I doubt that it will rain tomorrow.
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The perceived likelihood of rain tomorrow (assuming I am to be believed)
is higher for (31) than for (32); the difference would generally be interpreted
as (31) being within the positively-poled region, while (32) falls within the
negatively poled. Thus, weights assigned to markers such as believe, contend,
surmise must reflect their positive polarity, which markers such as doubt,
disagree, dispute, etc., must reflect their negative polarity. This may be seen
in the examples shown in in Figure 7.9 below.
The reader will certainly note that this bears a noticeable resemblance to
charts containing the hedges discussed earlier in this chapter. Likewise, sim-
ilarly to hedges, hearsay and mindsay markers may be affected by boosters
and downtoners:
(33) I tend to doubt that...
(34) I rather suspect that...
(35) I very strongly believe that...
Relative rankings of these are shown in in Figure 7.10:
Figure 7.10: Example of relative weightings of some hearsay and mindsay
markers modified by boosters and downtoners.
Negation of hearsay/mindsay markers also behaves similarly to hedges, caus-
ing a pivot around the central axis as can be seen in Figure 7.11:
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Figure 7.11: Example of relative weightings of the negation of some hearsay
and mindsay markers.
In many instances of hearsay/mindsay, however, the situation is a bit
more complex than presented in statements (26) through (31). All of these
statements were written in the first person: I believe, I doubt, I infer. In
many cases, there will be a combination of mindsay and hearsay, as the
writer describes the beliefs, inferences and doubts of another individual or
group: researchers infer, sources believe,Mary doubts. Thus, any formulation
of mindsay which is not written in the first person needs to be weighted
doubly, namely as both hearsay and mindsay, as the speaker is clearing
passing on information received from another source. For example, consider
the following fragments:
(36) White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest stated he believes that. . . .
(37) Mary thinks it was Mark Twain who said. . . .
In (36) the writer is reporting something which the White House Press Secre-
tary said (hearsay), while Josh Earnest spoke of his belief (mindsay). In (37)
it is even more complex: the writer repeats something Mary said (hearsay),
Mary expressed her belief (mindsay) that Mark Twain (or perhaps someone
else) said (hearsay) something quotable.
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Hearsay/mindsay markers may also appear with hedges, as seen in ex-
amples (38) through (40):
(38) I believe that it is possible that George is home now.
(39) My neighbor claims that it is impossible that John and Susan got
married last weekend.
(40) We heard that there is supposed to be a big sale at the department
store this weekend.
(41) I strongly suspect that another attack is very likely to occur within
the next few weeks.
When chained with hedges or other hearsay/mindsay markers, negatively-
poled hearsay/mindsay markers functions as negation:
(42) I doubt that it is possible that George could be home now.
(43) The CIA refutes the contention that the attack might have been car-
ried out by government supporters.
(44) Mr. Smith vehemently denies that he may possibly run for office in
the near future.
(45) I doubt that it is unlikely to rain this evening.
(46) Marjorie doesn't deny that she may be trying to have a baby.
A simple example of interactions between hedges and negatively-poled hearsay/mindsay
markers may be viewed in Figure 7.12
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Figure 7.12: Example of relative weightings of the hedges likely, not likely,
unlikely, and not unlikely, as well as likely and unlikely chained with the
negatively-poled mindsay marker doubt.
Thus, we can see, modification of such hearsay/mindsay markers is sim-
ilar to modification of hedges.
wmodified hearsay/mindsay =
whearsay/mindsay + p ∗ effectmodifier ∗ (1− |whearsay/mindsay|)
(7.20)
Since hearsay and mindsay always reduce the strength of the proposition, i.e.,
they act as downtoners, but as, in contrast to what we have seen previously,
in which they softened a hedge, hearsay/mindsay markers act as downtoners
to the entire proposition:
effecthearsay/mindsay = (1− |whearsay/mindsay|) (7.21)
Chaining of hearsay/mindsay markers (Mary thinks it was Mark Twain who
said. . . .) is done multiplicatively.
As downtoners on the entire proposition, they have a direct effect on the
evidentiality measure of a proposition, so we can now pull all of the pieces









where e = the evidentiality weight of the proposition, hedgei is the cumu-
lative weight of all (modified or unmodified) hedges in the proposition, and
hearsay/mindsayj is the cumulative effect of all hearsay/mindsay markers
present.
Thus we have a simplified, but easily programmable and implemented
algorithm for the calculation of evidential weights.
7.7 Grey Areas
In Chapter 6 we discussed a variety of perhaps somewhat less obvious mark-
ers of uncertainty. For example, in certain domains, the use of passive voice
in English is seen as a indication of uncertainty by which the author dis-
tances herself from the assertion in the statement (and thereby signalling
an unwillingness to commit fully to its veracity). In other domains, such as
scholarly writing (this thesis is an immediate example thereof), the use of
passive voice is quite customary and carries, in general, no particular sig-
nificance (although the roots of that usage may also lie in an unwillingness
to commit fully to experimental results). Therefore, the option to view the
use of the passive voice as a factor in the determination of the evidential
weight of a proposition will need to be determined by the implementer of
this algorithm. (And, it should be noted, the treatment would be similar to
that of hearsay/mindsay markers.)
In the examples which we have chosen, we have also not explicitly dis-
cussed an example such as the following:
(47) John is a possible terrorist.
This statement may be viewed in two ways: 1) that "John is a terrorist" is
the assertion that we are evaluating and the adjective possible would inject
some uncertainty into the veracitv of this statement; and 2) that "John is
a possible terrorist" is that to which we are assigning an evidential weight,
and, thus for lack of evidentials indicating uncertainty, we accept it as a true
statement. The decision as to which option is most valid again lies with the
implementer.
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Yet another area which we have not concretely evaluated in this chap-
ter has to do with the future tense of verbs. If the focus of one's work
is predictive or proactive, for example, examining future trends in order
to ward off negative events, then using information about future events or
states would be of interest (and, again, treated within the algorithm simi-
larly to hearsay/mindsay). If, however, one's goal is to develop, say, a wiki
the content of which is factual, then such speculative information may be
undesirable. The decision to use or ignore information which is stated using
the future tense is thus, once again, up to the implementer.
The abovementioned are just a few examples of possible measures of ev-
idential uncertainty at the sentence level which are open to interpretation;
there will certainly be others, depending upon the domain which is being
used. The decision to include or exclude any of these is that of the imple-
menter.
7.8 Summary
In this chapter we have tied together various concepts from the preceding
chapters: the roles of hedges, boosters and downtoners in signalling the
writer's commitment to the proposition; the "univesal" ordering into a co-
hesive algorithm for calculating evidential weights for propositions at the
sentence level which can be used by practitioners of information extraction,
knowledge acquisition and information fusion to ensure the quality of in-
formation extracted from English natural language texts. Clearly, not all
problems are solved, and there is still much to do with information quality




Conclusions and Future Work
An approximate answer to the right problem is worth a good deal more than
an exact answer to an approximate problem. John Tukey 1962, p. 13
In life, we make the best decisions we can with the information we have on
hand. Agnes Kamara-umunna goodreads.com [retrieved Jan. 3, 2016]

As always with such an undertaking as a thesis like this, one hopes to
contribute a small morsel to the current body of knowledge in one's field. In
this case, the work should be interesting to at least two fields of research:
linguistics, as we are dealing with fine points of natural language, and second,
the field of application for which the results were originally intended.
For linguists, the transferability of the concepts of universal ordering of
expressions of uncertainty, as opposed to universal values should be inter-
esting. One might say that this applies to all natural languages in one form
or another. Additionally, the mathematics underlying the interworking of
hedges, boosters, downtoners as well as hearsay and mindsay markers should
be, with some adaption, transferable to many, if not all, natural languages.
We hope that this will prove useful.
The topic of this thesis arose as a result of the search for an imple-
118
mentable, pragmatic solution to determination of information quality for
use in the field of information fusion. As our striving to make sense of the
deluge of text-based information continues, and, in particular, as the need
for understanding the reliability of that information grows, this work should
help to increase the quality of the information and knowledge we acquire us-
ing automated natural language processes. This is of paramount importance
for practitioners in the field.
We believe that the results of this thesis is a step in the right direction.
However, we also see that there is work yet to be done, and we will discuss
some aspects of this in the following sections.
8.1 Assigning weights for application
Ultimately, the purpose of this work is not an end in itself, but rather to
devise a mechanism for automatically generating evidentiality weightings for
simple and complex hedges that can later be used in applications using, for
example, some of the mathematics for uncertainty discussed in Chapter 3. In
other words, in the the area of information fusion, there are well-developed,
widely-used, broadly accepted mathematical models for analyzing uncertain
data based upon Bayesian probabilities, Dempster-Shafer, and fuzzy math-
ematics which already exist. There is no driving need within the fusion
community to develop new mathematics. However, the research area of data
and information fusion began several decades ago to automatically fuse data
received from various sensors such as radar and sonar systems, and ground
and air sensors. The data from these devices is easily represented as numer-
ical quantities (thus "hard" information), and therefore easy to manipulate
using mathematical models, and to produce algorithmic results which are
assigned a numerical value representing the likelihood of the result being
"true." Natural language information is less easy to quantify since it is of-
ten open to interpretation. Integration of natural language information into
existing mathematical models has been problematic due to lack of adequate
quantification of that information, which has remained a hurdle to the inte-
gration of both device-derived and natural information in such models.
The results of this thesis ease the quantification issue. However, the
results of Chapter 7 are a bridge to the mathematics needed for fusion. In
order for these to be utilized in practical applications in information fusion,
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they need to be converted into numerical values (in general between 0.0 and
1.0) which make sense within the mathematics of uncertainty used for this
purpose.
However, this is quite an easy task, as we shall see below.
Suppose the application in which we use the propositional information we
have extracted requires weights from 0.0 to 1.0, i.e., reflecting percentages.
We would generated the evidential weight associated with the propositional
content extracted from a sentence, locate it on our scale from -1.0 to 1.0,
and then, mapping percentage values on to our scales we would end up with
weights such as very unlikely being 10% or 0.1, unlikely being 30% or
0.3,not unlikely being 70% (0.7), and very likely being 90% (0.9).
Figure 8.1: Mapping a percentage scale onto relative weightings determined
by the algorithm.
Similarly, if the underlying system which implements this model relies
upon fuzzy values, this mapping is also trivial. Note that the mapping of
the Words of Estimative Probability from Chapter 6 very nicely coincide
with the results of the algorithm.
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Figure 8.2: Mapping a fuzzy scale onto relative weightings determined by
the algorithm.
Thus, in order to integrate the results of this thesis into another mathe-
matical system, one needs only provide an appropriate mapping function to
derive the range weights that are needed.
8.2 Open Questions
One thing which has not been discussed within this thesis has to do with the
scope of the hedges and hearsay/mindsay markers within a more complex
sentence  that is, we have assumed a sentence with a single proposition, with
the result that all appearances of evidentiality apply to that one proposition.
However, it is not always so that a sentence contains a single proposition or
a single element which is hedged or re-told, therefore the practitioner is
behooved to consider which sentence elements are or are not affected by
these markers.
There are also open questions concerning the granularity of the hedges
and modifiers. In particular, the weighting of hearsay and mindsay markers
for named sources (individuals, institutions, etc.) or source types (police,
government agencies, news organizations) based upon information known
about the source such as area of expertise, past performance, etc. As men-
tioned previously in this thesis, these are important considertations but be-
121
yond the scope of the work here.
Among the areas which remain open is the ability to cross the boundaries
of a given sentence to examine in the words which come before or which follow
to see if there are more clues as to the veracity of the information we find
in a single sentence. The work done here is limited to a single sentence (or
less, in the case of compound sentences). This is a good start, but not the
end by a long shot.
122
Bibliography
Alexandra Y. Aikhenvald. Evidentiality. Oxford University Press, Oxford,
2004.
Lloyd B. Anderson. Evidentials, paths of change, and mental maps: ty-
pologically regular asymmetries. In Wallace Chafe and Johanna Nichols,
editors, Evidentiality: The Linguistic Coding of Epistemology, pages 273
312, Norwood, NJ, 1986. Ablex Publishing Corp.
Alain Auger and Jean Roy. Expression of Uncertainty in Linguistic Data. In
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Information Fusion,
Cologne, Germany, 2008.
Bilal M. Ayyub and George J. Klir. Uncertainty Modeling and Analysis in
Engineering and the Sciences. JChapman and Hall/CRC, Boca Raton,
2006.
Janet Barnes. Evidentials in the Tuyuka verb. International Journal of
American Linguistics, 50:255271, 1984.
Bastian Beylage-Haarmann. Zwischen wahr und wahrscheinlich - Eine
psycholinguistische Untersuchung der Modalsemantik im Englischen:
Ranking und Unterschiede zum Deutschen. http://storage.sk.uni-
bonn.de/abschlussarbeiten/magisterarbeit_haarmann.pdf, 2010.
Douglas Biber. Variation across speech and writing. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1988.
Douglas Biber and Edward Finegan. Styles of stance in English: Lexical and
grammatical marking of evidentiality and affect. Text, 9:93124, 1989.
Franz Boas. Kwakiutl grammar, with a glossary of the suffixes. Transactions
of the American Philosophical Society, 37:203377, 1947.
123
Lauren Browning. Mind-blowing growth and power of big data. Business
Insider, 22:169194, 2015.
Wibecke Brun and Karl Halvor Teigen. Verbal probabilities: Ambiguous,
context-dependent, or both? Organizational Behavior and Human Deci-
sion Processes, 41(3):390  404, 1988. ISSN 0749-5978.
Joan Bybee and Suzanne Fleischmann. Modality in grammar and discourse:
An introductory essay. In Joan Bybee and Suzanne Fleischmann, editors,
Modality in Grammar and Discourse, pages 3767, Amsterdam, 1995. John
Benjamins.
C.A.B. Smith. Consistency in statistical inference and decision (with discus-
sion). Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B, 23:125, 1961.
Cambridge Dictionaries Online. http://dictionary.cambridge.org/ dictio-
nary/ english /couple, retrieved on Feb. 16, 2016.
Cambridge Dictionaries Online. http://dictionary.cambridge.org /dictio-
nary/ english/several, retrieved on Feb. 16, 2016.
Lewis Carroll. Through the Looking-Glass. Hayes Barton Press, Raleigh, NC,
1872.
Wallace Chafe and Johanna Nichols, editors. Evidentiality: The linguistic
coding of epistemology. Ablex Publishing Corp., Norwood, NJ, 1986.
E.V. Clark. The principle of contrast: a constraint on language acquisition.
In B. MacWhinney, editor, Mechanisms of Language Acquisition, Hilldale,
NJ, 1987. Erlbaum.
E.V. Clark. On the logic of contrast. Journal of Child Language, 55:767811,
1988.
David Clausen. HedgeHunter: A System for Hedge Detection ad Uncertainty
Classification. In Proceedings of the Fourtheenth Conference on Computa-
tional Natural Language Learning: Shared Task, pages 120125, Uppsala,
Sweden, 2010. Assocation for Computational Linguistics.
Gudrun Clemen. Hecken in deutschen und englischen Tex-
ten der Wirtschaftskommunikation. Eine konstrastive Analyse.
124
PhD thesis, retrieved Apr. 30, 2015 from http://www.ub.uni-
siegen.de/pub/diss/fb3/1999/clemen/clemen.pdf, 1998.
Peter Crompton. Hedging in Academic Writing: Some Theoretical Problems.
English for Specific Purposes, 16:271287, 1997.
Bruno de Finetti. Theory of Probability, Vol. 1. John Wiley and Sons, New
York, 1974.
Remy de Gourmont. Philosophic nights in Paris. J.W. Luce, Boston, 1920.
Ferdinand de Haan. The place of inference within the evidential system.
International Journal of American Linguistics, 67(2):193219, 2001.
Ferdinand DeHaan. Evidentiality and Epistemic Modality: Setting Bound-
aries. Southwest Journal of Linguistics, (18), 1999.
Dictionary.com. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/couple, retrieved
on Feb. 16, 2016a.
Dictionary.com. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/hedge , retrieved
on Feb. 16, 2016b.
Gabriele Diewald and Elena Smirnova. Evidentiality in German: Linguistic
Realization and Regularities in Grammaticalization. De Gruyter Mouton,
Berlin, 2010.
Dider Dubois and Henri Prade. Possibility theory and its applications: a ret-
rospective and prospective view. In 2003 IEEE International Conference
on Fuzzy Systems. IEEE, 2003.
Didier Dubois and Henri Prade. A review of fuzzy set aggregation con-
nectives. Annals of Mathematics and Artification Intelligence, 32:3566,
2001.
Didier Dubois, Henri Prade, and H.T. Nguyen. Fuzzy sets and probability:
misunderstandings, bridges and gaps. In D. Dubois and H. Prade, editors,
Fundamentals of Fuzzy Sets, pages 343438, Boston, Mass, 2000. Kluwer.
Edgar Watson Howe. Sinner Sermons: A Selection of the Best Paragraphs
of E.W. Howe, 1926.
125
Norman Fairclough. Discourse and Social Change. Blackwell, Malden, MA,
1992.
F.H. Knight, editor. Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit. Hart, Schaffner and
Marx, Houghton Miin Company, Boston, 1921.
Zygmunt Frajzyngier. Truth and the indicative sentence. Studies in Lan-
guage, 9(2):243254, 1985.
Dick Francis. 10 lb. Penalty. Jove Books, Berkeley Publishing Company,
1997.
Jeffrey A. Friedman and Richard Zeckhauser. Handling and Mishandling
Estimative Probability: Likelihood, Confidence, and the Search for Bin
Laden. Intelligence and National Security, 30:7799, 2015.
Nahum Gershon. Visualization of an Imperfect World). Computer Graphics
and Applications, 18(4):4345, July 1998.
I.J. Good. Probabiltiy and the weighting of evidence. Griffin, London, 1950.
goodreads.com. http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/533915-in-life-we-make-
the-best-decisions-we-can-with, retrieved Jan. 3, 2016.
Benedicte Goujon. Uncertainty Detection For Information Extraction. In In-
ternational Conference RANLP 2009, pages 118122, Borovets, Bulgaria,
2009.
Alan Hajek. Interpretations of Probability. The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, 2012.
M. Halliday. Functional diversity in language as seen from a consideration
of modality and mood in English. Foundations of Language, 6:322361,
1970.
Janet Holmes. Expressung Doubt and Certainty in English. RELC Journal,
13(9):928, 1982.
Ken Hyland. Hedging in academic Writing and EAP Textbooks. English for
Specific Purposes, 13(3):239256, 1994.
Ken Hyland. Hedging in Scientific Research Articles. John Benjamins, Am-
sterdam/Philadelphia, 1998.
126
Ken Hyland. Hedges, Boosters and lexical invisibility: noticing modifiers in
academic texts . Language Awareness, 9(4):179197, 2000.
Elly Ifantidou. Evidentials and Relevance. John Benjamins Publishing, 1986.
T. Inagaki. Interdependence between Safety-Control Policy and Multiple-
Sensor Schemes Via Dempster-Shafer Theory. IEEE Transactions on Re-
liability, 40(2):182188, 1991.
Roman Jakobson. Shifters, Verbal Categories and the Russian Verb. Harvard
University, Dept of Slavic Languages and Literature, Cambridge, MA,
1957.
Anne-Laure Jousselme, Patrick Maupin, and Eloi Bosse. Uncertainty in a
Situation Analysis Perspective. In Proceedings of FUSION 2003, Cairns,
Australia, 2003. IEEE.
Richards J. Heuer Jr. Psychology of Intelligence Analysis. Center for the
Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1999.
Anne Kao and Stephen R. Poteet, editors. Natural Language Processing and
Text Mining. Springer, London, 2007.
Sherman Kent. Words of Estimative Probability. Studies in Intelligence,
(Fall 1964), 1964.
John Maynard Keynes, editor. Treatise on probability. Harper and Row,
New York, 1962.
George J. Klir and Richard M. Smith. On measuring uncertainty and
uncertainty-based information: Recent developments. Annals of Math-
ematics and Artificial Intelligence, 32(1):533, 2001.
George J. Klir and Mark J. Wierman. Uncertainty-Based Information: El-
ements of Generalized Information Theory. Studies in Fuzziness and Soft
Computing. Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg, second edition, 1999.
Joerg Kohlas and Paul-Andre Monney. Representation of Evidence by Hints.
In R.R.Yager, J. Kacprzyk, and M. Fedrizzi, editors, Advances in the
Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence, pages 473492. Wiley, 1994.
127
Joerg Kohlas and Paul-Andre Monney. A Mathematical Theory of Hints,
An approach to the Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence. Number 425
in Lecture Notes in Economic and Mathematical Systems, Berlin, 1995.
Springer Verlag.
Paul Krause and Dominic Clark. Representing Uncertain Knowledge:,An
Artificial Intelligence Approach. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht,
1993.
Kellyn Kruger, Ulrich Schade, and Jürgen Ziegler. Uncertainty in the fusion
of information from multiple diverse sources for situation awareness . In
Proceedings of the 11thInternational Conference on Information Fusion,
pages 683690. IEEE, 2008.
William Labov. The boundaries of words and their meanings. In C.J.N.
Bailey and R. Shuy, editors, New Ways of Analyzing Variation in English,
pages 340373, Washington, DC, 1973. Georgetown University Press.
George Lakoff. Hedges: A study in Meaning Criteria and the Logic of Fuzzy
Concepts. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2:458508, 1973.
Elizabeth D. Liddy, Noriko Kando, and Victoria L. Rubin. Certainty Catego-
rization Model. In The AAAI Symposium on Exploring Attitude and Affect
in Text AAAI-EAAT 2004, Stanford, CA, 2004. American Association for
Artificial Intelligence.
Dennis V. Lindley. Understanding Uncertainty. John Wiley and Son, Hobo-
ken, NJ, 2006.
SIL LinguaLink. What is Epistemic Modality? http://www-
01.sil.org/linguistics/glossaryoflinguisticterms /WhatIsEpistemicModal-
ity.htm, retrieved Jun 10, 2015.
Juana I. Marin-Arrese. Effective vs. Epistemic Stance, and Subjectiv-
ity/Intersubjectivity in Political Discourse. A Case Study. In Anastasios
Tsangalides and Roberta Facchinetti, editors, Studies on English Modality:
In Honour of Frank Palmer, pages 2352, Bern, 2009. Peter Lang AG.
Juana I. Marin-Arrese. Epistemic legitimizing strategies, commitment and
accountability in discourse. Discourse Studies, 13:789797, 2011.
128
Elizabeth Marshman. Expressions of uncertainty in candidate knowledge-
rich contexts. A comparison in English and French specialized texts. Ter-
minology, 14(1):124147, 2008.
Merriam-Webster Dictionary. http://www.merriam-webster.com /dictionary
/couple, retrieved on Feb. 16, 2016a.
Merriam-Webster Dictionary. http://www.merriam-webster.com /dictionary
/some, retrieved on Feb. 16, 2016b.
Merriam-Webster Dictionary. http://www.merriam-webster.com /dictionary
/hedge, retrieved on Feb. 16, 2016c.
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. http://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary /polarity, retrieved on Aug. 23, 2014.
Richard Nordquist. stance (communication process). http:// gram-
mar.about.com /od/rs /g/stanceterm.htm, retrieved Jun 13, 2015.
Janis Nuckolls and Lev Michael. Evidentials and evidential strategies in
interactional and socio-cultural context. Pragmatics and Society, 3(2),
2014.
Oxford Dictionaries. http://www.oxforddictionaries.com /defini-
tion/english/evidence, retrieved Apr. 4, 2015.
Oxford Dictionaries. http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ english
/couple, retrieved on Feb. 16, 2016a.
Oxford Dictionaries. http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition /english
/several, retrieved on Feb. 16, 2016b.
Oxford Dictionaries. http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ english
/hedge, retrieved on Feb. 16, 2016c.
Oxford English Dictionary. http://www.oed.com, retrieved on Sep. 29, 2010.
Frank R. Palmer. Mood and Modality. Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, 1986.
Jennifer Stevens Pappas. Qualifiers in Patient-Physician Discourse: An Anal-
ysis of Interviews from Radio Call-In Programs. Education Linguistics, 5
(2), 1989.
129
Zdzislaw Pawlak. Rough sets. International Journal of Parallel Program-
ming, 11(5):341356, 1982.
Pliny the Elder. The Complete Works of Pliny the Elder. Delphi Classics,
2015.
Kristin Precht. Stance moods in spoken English: Evidentiality and affect in
British and American conversation. Text, 23:239257, 2003.
Ellen Prince, Joel Frader, and Charles Bosk. On hedging in physician-
physician discourse. In R. J. di Pietro, editor, Linguistics and the pro-
fessions, pages 8397, Hillsdale, NJ, 1982. Ablex.
Anna Prokofieva and Julia Hirschberg. Hedging Annotation Man-
ual. http://www.cs.columbia.edu/ prokofieva /HedgingAnnotationMan-
ualv21.pdf, retrieved Sep 15, 2015.
Brainy Quotes. Donald Rumsfeld. http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/
authors /d /donald_rumsfeld.html, retrieved 23 Aug 2014.
Silja Renooij and Cilia L.M. Witteman. Talking probabilities: communi-
cating probabilistic information with words and numbers. International
Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 22:169194, 1999.
Steven Rieber. Communicating Uncertainty in Intelligence Analysis.
http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p100689_index.htmlf, 2006.
Roget's 21st Century Thesaurus, Third Edition. http://thesaurus.com
/browse /uncertainty, retrieved on Sep. 29, 2010.
Galina L. Rogova and Eloi Bosse. Information Quality in Information Fu-
sion. In Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Information
Fusion, Edinburgh, Scotland, 2010. IEEE.
Johan Rooryck. Evidentiality, Part I. Glot International, 5(4):125133, April
2001a.
Johan Rooryck. Evidentiality, Part II. Glot International, 5(5):161168, May
2001b.
Victoria L. Rubin. Epistemic modality: From uncertainty to certainty in
the context of information seeking as interactions with texts. Information
Processing and Management, 46(5):533  540, 2010. ISSN 0306-4573.
130
Victoria L. Rubin. Stating with Certainty or Stating with Doubt: Inter-
coder Reliability Results for Manual Annotation of Epistemically Modal-
ized Statements. In Proceedings of NAACL HLT2007, Companion Volume,
pages 141144, Rochester, NY, April 2007. Association for Computational
Linguistics.
Bertrand Russell. Am I an Atheist or an Agnostic? The Literary Guide and
Rationalist Review, 64(7):115116, July 1949.
Bertrand Russell. The Philosophy of Logical Atomism. Routledge Classics,
2015. original printing date 1918.
Michael Schrage. What Percent Is 'Slam Dunk'? Give Us Odds on Those
Estimates . Washington Post, February 20,2005.
Glenn Shafer. A Mathematical Theory of Evidence. Princeton University
Press, Princeton, 1976.
John Skelton. The Care and Maintenance of Hedges. ELT Journal, 42(1):
3743, 1968.
Philippe Smets. Imperfect information : Imprecision - Uncertainty. Technical
report, IRIDIA, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, July 2, 1999.
Philippe Smets and Robert Kennes. The Transferable Belief Model. Tech-
nical report, IRIDIA, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 1994.
Michael Smithson. Ignorance and Uncertainty: Emerging Paradigms. Studies
in Fuzziness and Soft Computing. Springer Verlag, New York, 1989.
Michael Smithson. Ignorance and Science. Dilemmas, Perspectives, and
Prospects. Science Communication, 15(2):133156, 1993.
Susan Gunelius. The data explosion in 2014 minute by minute - info-
graphic. http://aci.info/2014/07/12/the-data-explosion-in-2014-minute-
by-minute-infographic/, retrieved July 12, 2014.
Christof Tannert, Horst-Dietrich Elvers, and Burkhard Jandrig. The ethics
of uncertainty. In the light of possible dangers, research becomes a moral
duty. EMBO Reports, 8(10):892896, 2007.
131
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition.
definition of evidence. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/evidence,
retrieved on Aug. 23, 2014.
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition.
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/uncertainty, retrieved on Feb. 10,
2013.
Judi Thomson, Beth Hetzler, Alan MacEachren, Mark Gahegan, and Misha
Pavel. A typology for visualizing uncertainty. In Proceedings of SPIE,
volume SPIE5669, pages 146157, 2005.
John Tukey. The future of data analysis. Annals of Mathematical Statistics,
33:167, 1962.
Irena Vassileva. Commitment and detachment in English and Bulgarian.
English for Specific Purposes, 20:83102, 2001.
Ignacio Vazquez and Diana Giner. Writing with Conviction: The Use of
Boosters in Modelling Persuasion in Academic Discourses. Revista Al-
cantina de Estudios Ingelese, 22:219237, 2009.
Kai von Fintel. Modality and Language. In Donald M. Borchert, editor,
Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Second Edition, Detroit, 2012. MacMillin
References USA.
David Weber. Information perspective, profile, and patterns in Quechua.
In Wallace Chafe and Johanna Nichols, editors, Evidentiality: The lin-
guistic coding of epistemology, page 137155, Norwood, NJ, 1986. Ablex
Publishing Corp.
Websters Online. definition of evidence. http://www.websters-online-
dictionary.org/evidence, retrieved Apr. 4, 2015.
Webster's Online Dictionary. http://www.webstersonlinedictionary.org, re-
trieved on Sep. 29, 2010.
Caroline J. Wesson and Briony D. Pulford. Verbal Expressions of Confidence
and Doubt. Psychological Reports, 105:151160, 2009.
Robert R. Westmoreland. A Semantic Theory of the English Auxiliary Sys-
tem. PhD thesis, Indiana University, 1998.
132
Kristan J. Wheaton. What Do Words Of Estimative Probability Mean? An
Exercise In Analyst Education. unpublished, 2008.
P.R.R. White. Evaluative semantics and ideological positioning in journal-
istic discourse: A new framework for analysis. In J. Strunck I. Lassen
and T. Vestergaard, editors, Mediating Ideology in Text and Image, pages
3767, Amsterdam, 2006. John Benjamins.
Thomas Willett. A Cross-Linguistic Survey of the Grammaticization of Ev-
identiality. Studies in Language, 12(1):5197, 1988.
W.J.M. Levelt. Speaking: From Intention to Articulation. MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, MA, 1989.
WordNet. definition of evidence. http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl
/webwn?s=evidence, retrieved Apr. 4, 2015.
Ronald R. Yager. Aggregating criteria with quantifiers. Proceedings of the
ACM SIGART International Symposium on Methodologies for Intelligent
Systems, ISMIS'86, 32(1):183189, 1986.
Lotfi A. Zadeh. Fuzzy Sets. Information and Control, 8:338358, 1965.
Lotfi A. Zadeh. Fuzzy Sets as a Basis for a Theory of Possibility. Fuzzy Sets
and Systems, 1:328, 1978.
Lianwen Zhang. Uncertainty Representation Using Fuzzy Measures. In
R.R.Yager, J. Kacprzyk, and M. Fedrizzi, editors, Advances in the
Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence, pages 5169, New York, 1994. John
Wiley and Sons.
Alf C. Zimmer. A model for the interpretation of verbal predictions. Inter-
national Journal of Man-Machine Studies, 20:121134, 1984.
133
